At dawn on the rain-soaked Sunday of June 25, 1950, around 4:00 am, ten divisions of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), including three reserve divisions along with 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks (of which 120 belonged to the elite 105th Tank Brigade), launched a swift attack on the lines of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) after a two hours heavy bombardment. Soviet advisors guided the initial breakthrough.

The latter consisted of eight understrength divisions, a force primarily designed for border defense and internal security duties. There were no battle tanks, adequate artillery, fighter aircraft, or bombers. The air force comprised merely twenty-two aircraft, reconnaissance, and training, while the mechanized forces consisted of twenty-seven armored vehicles. Just a few weeks before the invasion, a series of reconnaissances of the 38th Parallel area concluded a report that the ROK Army was unable to make any significant advances northward in case of war but it could offer strong resistance – obviously an exaggeration.

Although the invasion come as no real surprise to South Koreans or even the handful of Americans, it caught the South Korean forces literally asleep or more accurately, completely inert. The command was not alerted to the full-scale invasion and it was simply regarded as another skirmish on the border – just a week earlier, approximately 20 South Koreans had been killed in a bombing. John Gunther, in his biography of MacArthur, writes : ”On the morning of June 25, the North Koreans launched an attack by no fewer than four divisions, assisted by three constabulary brigades; 70.000 men (..), about 70 tanks went into action simultaneously at four different points. (..) To assemple such a force, arm and equip it (..) must have taken at least a month..It was more disgraceful than Pearl Harbor.”

From Ongjin in the west at 4:00 a.m. to the eastern coast, the attacks succeeded almost everywhere despite the fact that several points of defense held until July 3rd. In the Ongjin province in the northwest, by the evening of the second day, the 6th KPA Division had forced the complete withdrawal of the hostile 17th Division, which was evacuated by sea, leaving behind all artillery of 105mm caliber, heading towards Seoul. The Kaesong corridor, a wide valley without any natural barriers was guarded only by the 1st ROK division which rapidly retreated after briefly offering staunch resistance. The limited artillery assets (only 15 guns of 105 mm) were insufficient to turn the tide.. The city of Kaesong fell after just 5 hours.

“The North Koreans repeated a technique that had remarkable results every time: they engaged enemy fortified positions with frontal attacks or continuous fire, then sent forces around the flanks, if possible, to encircle the enemy so that it would either destroy it or force it to surrender or, failing that, prevent withdrawal or reinforcements,” noted Bevin Alexander.

This succeeded almost everywhere. Even in the few instances where the ROKA managed to hold some attacks (as did the 1st Division, prompting the Soviet ambassador in the North Korean capital to remark, “The enemy is resisting, and as he retreats, there is no mass capture of his units observed”), it was inconsequential as the overwhelming portion of the front was rapidly retreating. The ROKA’s 7th Division was crushed in the “Uijongbu corridor” when attacked by the 3rd and 4th KPA Divisions along with the T-34/85 tanks, and the counterattack, supposedly with the assistance of the 2nd Division that refused to engage, ended in a fiasco. South Korean General Paik Sun Yup later admitted that his men suffered from the “T-34 disease.” “The symptoms of the disease were immediate. As soon as the men heard the word ‘tank,’ they became terrified.”

The road to Seoul was wide open. There was complete panic there. Civilians, the government, and the military were in complete disarray except for a few units. The afternoon of June 27 was decided as the date for abandoning the city. However, there was no order, and a mass of civilians and soldiers were still in the city. Nevertheless, engineers detonated the main bridge over the Han River in the southern part of the city along with whoever civilians and soldiers were on it in the early morning hours of the 28th! The worst part was that the majority of the South Korean Army was still inside the city and had been cut off from their comrades, and no one took responsibility for the act.

The word chaos is small enough to describe what followed. Soldiers in groups of 2, 3, 4, 5 were crossing the river by swimming. Every vehicle, gun, and equipment was abandoned. Of the approximately 90,000 men on June 25, the South Korean Army now counted only 22,000 combat-ready men! Of course, the opportunity was seized upon, with the Communists filming the vast array of American military equipment and vehicles abandoned by their adversaries. This footage was utilized for propagandistic purposes to underscore their considerable triumph.

The KPA had achieved an exemplary blitzkrieg. However, the conflict had now lost its character as an internal struggle as the United States and China would also intervene in this Northeast Asian corner.

Bibliography

A. Bevin, “Korea: The First War We Lost”, publ. Hippocrene, 1987.

S. Sandler, “The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished”, publ. University Press of Kentucky, 1999.

C. Malkasian, “The Korean War 1950-1953”, publ. Osprey Publishing Limited, 2001.