Cover image: Ramses II fighting from a chariot at the Battle of Kadesh with two archers, one with the reins tied around the waist to free both hands (relief from Abu Simbel, 13th century BC)

Text by Manolis Chatzimanolis

Aspiring to restore Egyptian sovereignty over the vast frontiers up to the Euphrates that it had enjoyed during the glorious reign of the ruler Thutmose III (1504–1450 BC), Pharaoh Ramesses II (1279–1213 BC) assembled his troops in the spring of 1274 BC in the capital Pi-Ramesses for yet another campaign in what is now central Syria. His objective was the Syrian city of Kadesh, which had defected to the hated Hittites of King Muwatalli II (1295–1272 BC), who, having as his center of power the city of Hattusa in central Asia Minor, already dominated northern Syria and aspired to expand southward.

The forces that Ramesses assembled were indeed impressive and indicative of the strength of the permanently organized Egyptian army of the New Kingdom. They consisted of four “divisions,” each stationed in a city of the kingdom: the corps of Set based in Pi-Ramesses, the corps of Ptah coming from Memphis, the corps of Amun from Thebes, and the corps of Ra from Heliopolis. This army of native Egyptians, which included infantry, archers, and about 2,000–2,500 light chariots manned by a driver and an archer, was accompanied by numerous auxiliary allied units and mercenaries: heavily armed Shardana (Sardinians?) swordsmen, black Nubian archers from present-day Sudan, Libyan infantry, mercenary nomadic Medjay, Bedouin tribes from Sinai, and Syrian charioteers and infantry from the kingdoms of southern Syria that were subject to Egypt. All these formed a cohesive army of about 20,000 men, an exceptionally large force by the standards of the time.

The Hittite army of King Muwatalli II, which had assembled northwest of Kadesh, consisted of a multilingual force of 27,000 warriors drawn from a mosaic of ethnic groups: royal troops from Hatti (chariots and infantry) and soldiers of the prince of Nesa from central Asia Minor; mercenaries from Nahrina (the former state of Mitanni) in northwestern Mesopotamia; western Anatolian Luwian vassals from Masa (classical Mysia), Arzawa (a confederation of tribes and city-states around the rivers Maeander and Cayster), Pitassa (east of Arzawa), Karkisa (Caria), and Lukka (Lycia). Men from Wilusa (Homeric Ilion) were sent by their king Alaksandu (Alexander?), along with Dardanians and Mushki (proto-Phrygians?) from northwestern Asia Minor. Warriors came from the tribes of Arzawa and Kaska on the shores of the Black Sea. Soldiers also came from Kizzuwatna (classical Cilicia) and Syrians from Ugarit, Carchemish, Kadesh, and Halba (Aleppo). The striking force of the Hittite army was its 3,500 heavy chariots, each crewed by a driver, a shield-bearer, and a warrior spearman.

The Egyptian troops departed from Egypt following the usual coastal route toward Gaza. There Ramesses divided his army into two unequal bodies. One elite corps (the Ne’arin) would follow the coastal road, securing the coastal cities of Canaan and the land of Amurru (present-day coastal Syria). It would then turn inland to meet Ramesses outside Kadesh. Meanwhile, the Pharaoh himself, leading the main army, would follow the inland route north through the Bekaa Valley (present-day Lebanon) and toward the ridge of Kadesh, from where he could oversee the city of the same name, which lay “nestled” on the left bank of the Orontes River. When he arrived there at the end of April, he received information from deserters of the Bedouin Shasu tribe that the Hittite army had withdrawn north toward Aleppo, abandoning Kadesh.

Considering the opportunity too good to miss and neglecting to send his own scouts to confirm the report, Ramesses immediately set out north in search of the enemy. With him he had his personal guard and the division of Amun, while the divisions of Ra, Ptah, and Set followed behind. Indeed, after crossing the southern bend of the Orontes River, he discovered northwest of the city of Kadesh the abandoned Hittite camp. The information given by the Bedouin deserters seemed to be confirmed.

In reality, however, the Hittite army was waiting for the Egyptians unseen on the eastern bank of the Orontes, with the cunning Muwatalli having the Egyptians exactly where he wanted them. While Ramesses with his bodyguard and the division of Amun were preparing to encamp, the Egyptians of the Ra division were approaching unsuspectingly, and the Ptah division was crossing the river as well—also unaware of anything. Soon, 1,000 Hittite heavy chariots began to cross the Orontes and pour onto the dusty plain.

The attack of the Hittite chariots struck the Ra division on the flank while it was still in marching formation and literally swept it away, with only a few of its units managing to disengage together with two of Ramesses’ sons and take refuge in the Egyptian camp. The Hittite charioteers then turned north to crush Ramesses and the men of the Amun division in their camp. This moment was the most critical of the battle, and the Pharaoh soon found himself fighting a desperate struggle for his very life. An entire division of the Egyptian army had been destroyed, the Ptah corps continued its march unsuspectingly, and the Set corps was still on the southern bank of the Orontes. According to the account of the events given by Ramesses himself, as recorded in an inscription in the Ramesseum at Thebes, the desperate Egyptian Pharaoh appealed to his patron god Amun:

“[…] I call upon you, my father Amun. I am surrounded by foreigners whom I do not know. All the lands have united against me, and I am completely alone. My soldiers have abandoned me, and none of my charioteers cares for me. I call upon you and declare that Amun is worth more to me than a million soldiers and hundreds of thousands of charioteers and tens of thousands of brothers and children, even if they were all united together.”

At this critical turning point of the battle, when the Hittites had entered and were plundering the Egyptian camp and Ramesses was fighting surrounded by his enemies, the elite corps of the Ne’arin unexpectedly arrived from the coast like a deus ex machina with their experienced commanders, who immediately organized a counterattack and broke the suffocating encirclement around the Pharaoh.

Volleys of arrows decimated the Hittite charioteers, whose discipline had already loosened in the face of imminent victory and the desire to seize the rich Egyptian spoils. Muwatalli, who was observing the clash from the opposite bank, ordered another 1,000 chariots to cross the river and attack the Egyptians. However, the fierce counterattack of Ramesses and the elite troops on the one side and the arrival of the vanguard of the Ptah division on the other crushed them. Caught between hammer and anvil, the Hittite chariots began to retreat in confusion toward the river, turning the retreat into a slaughter:

“[…] The groom of Muwatalli, the commander of his infantry and chariots, the chief eunuch, and Hlepsaru, his official historian, were drowned. His charioteers Tarkumenes and Peyes, Tender the commander of his bodyguard, Kemyes the commander of the elite, Ajem the chief of the auxiliaries, and other distinguished men fell pierced by arrows. Many battalions fell into the Orontes to save themselves by swimming, but they were decimated. Mizraim, brother of Muwatalli, was saved on the opposite bank, but the prince of Nesa drowned. The general disaster of the allies was halted by a sortie of the garrison of Kadesh, thanks to which wounded men and fugitives were saved inside the walls.”

The day ended with a tactical victory for the Egyptians, since they remained masters of the battlefield. Despite the heavy losses suffered by the Hittite chariots, however, their infantry remained intact and combat-ready, while the Egyptians had lost one quarter of their army and much of their supplies had been destroyed or plundered. Under these conditions any plans to renew the clash the next day or to organize a siege were doomed to failure.

Thus, while Ramesses was preparing to give the signal for a return to Egypt, a delegation of Muwatalli arrived at the Egyptian camp with proposals to renew the peace treaty under the terms that had existed before the war: the Hittites would keep Amurru and Kadesh, while the Egyptians would retain the coastal land up to the city of Simyra. Although the terms were not to his liking, the Pharaoh decided to withdraw and return to Egypt. Although the Hittites bled heavily during the battle, losing among others many of their nobles, their leader had achieved his goal. The Egyptian advance had been stopped and he had not lost a single measure of land.

Relations between the two ancient superpowers would be definitively normalized with the accession to the throne of Hatti of King Hattusili III (1267–1237 BC), with Ramesses II taking as wife in 1245 BC the eldest daughter of the Hittite ruler. They would remain peaceful until the collapse of the Hittite state in 1190 BC.

Sources:

The Poem of Pentaur

Bulletin

Breasted, James Henry, “Treaty with the Hittites”, Ancient Records of Egypt: Historical Documents from the Earliest Times to the Persian Conquest. Vol. III. publ. University of Chicago Press, 1906, pp. 163–174 (secs. §367–§391), also pp. 174–175.

Publications of the Hittitologist Trevor Robert Bryce