Eventually, as the intensity of the assaults...
Cover photo: During his court defense, Kostas Georgiou consciously took full responsibility for his actions and stated that none of the other accused should be convicted as they were simply following his orders.
Kostas Georgiou was born in Cyprus in 1951, when the island was still under British occupation, and at the age of 12 his family chose to move to London. He enlisted in the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, an elite unit, in Northern Ireland. During his life he faced the IRA, the Marxists of the MPLA in Angola, as well as their Cuban allies who supported them.
He was recognized by his fellow soldiers as one of the unit’s best marksmen, with exceptional physical condition and military training. It is also reported that he participated and fired 26 rounds during “Bloody Sunday,” when more than 30 civilians in Derry were killed or injured. There are also reports that he caused disturbances after exchanging stone-throwing with his friend Nick Hall. A few months later, on February 18, 1972, together with Michael Wayhouse, he robbed a Post Office, after which they were arrested and sentenced to five years in prison and dismissal from the army. Although he later claimed that he was a colonel, Georgiou’s highest rank was that of corporal, and he likely never received officer training.
He was released after two years. In 1975 he worked temporarily in the construction sector. Seeking a better way to make a living, he decided to offer his services as a mercenary. A devotee of adventure and war, he was the first British citizen mercenary to arrive in Angola (on 02.12.75), having previously been recruited by Donald Belford, a former doctor in the British Army, and Colin Taylor as representatives of Holden Roberto’s FNLA.
Officially, Georgiou would work as auxiliary staff in a hospital in the northern part of the country. After Angola’s independence, the organizations were consumed by civil conflict in which the MPLA, receiving help from the Soviets and Cubans, fought the FNLA, which was supported by the CIA. Kostas flew to Angola to arrange all the preparations for himself and his three friends Nick Hall, Michael Wainwright, and Charlie Christodoulou (possibly his cousin), all old friends from the Parachute Regiment.
“Callan” (as he became known), or “Tony Cullen”—the pseudonym he used, taken from a deceased colleague—led a small military group of FNLA fighters as its commander at a time when, in late 1975, the organization was on the verge of collapse. One of them, a Portuguese man named “Madeira,” was a former boxing champion. The Portuguese were essential as translators during the reorganization of FNLA units taking place in São Salvador do Congo. This group consisted of several excellent, experienced soldiers, but they were far too few in number to achieve a decisive victory. The first contingent recruited consisted mainly of unemployed former professional soldiers. The recruits departed from Gatwick Airport to Brussels, where they were given false documents, and from there traveled to Kinshasa, from where they crossed the border.
The rest—especially the local soldiers—had very poor training, and there were communication problems since many of them did not speak English or spoke very little Portuguese (the official language). They had two Land Rovers equipped with 106 mm M40 recoilless rifles, a Panhard M3/VTT APC, an armored Dodge, a Ferret reconnaissance vehicle, a Panhard AML-90 with a 90 mm anti-tank gun, three Land Rovers with Browning .30 machine guns, and one Land Rover with a Goryunov machine gun. Nevertheless, their combat performance during their short campaign was impressive between January 5 and February 6, 1976.1
In a single ambush, on February 3, 1976, against an MPLA convoy, he killed between 60 and 80 of the roughly 600 communist MPLA and Cuban troops, destroyed 3–4 Soviet T-34/54/55 tanks, and four Katyusha rocket launchers—the “Stalin’s organs.” The attack, carried out by a small group of men, relied on surprise. The opposing forces immediately fled in panic, causing no losses to the attackers. Georgiou, “laughing and shouting,” cut down Cubans who were trying to escape from their burning vehicles.2 A few hours later, after finding temporary shelter in the jungle, they carried out a second raid, leaving 40 enemy dead and destroying one tank. Georgiou, a true “dog of war,” with complete disregard for his own safety, ran into the road and tried to kill as many Cubans as possible.
With his group of around 60 men, he continuously inflicted losses on his approximately 1,600 opponents by carrying out repeated ambushes—at least six during this period—applying what he had learned in the British Army. With total losses of about 20 men, he inflicted hundreds of casualties on the enemy and destroyed large amounts of equipment. He was always on the front line and maintained an aggressive spirit in every clash. His activity was so intense and his desire to keep constant pressure on the enemy throughout the day so strong that many of his soldiers could not keep up with him. Impressed by their efforts, Roberto sent Hall back to Britain to recruit a full battalion and also awarded the rank of colonel to “Callan.” To do this, he turned to the services of the private military company Security Advisory Services (SAS), founded by the former paratrooper John Banks and the former robber Dave Tomkins.
Initially successful, the unit began to show signs of disintegration because of Georgiou’s harsh leadership, as he executed 14 of his soldiers for deserting and taking the group’s vehicles with them.3 The British journalist Patrick Brogan described Georgiou as a “psychopathic killer” who executed his 14 mercenaries for cowardice and was extremely brutal toward blacks. On January 31 he executed another 23 who deserted en masse. It was estimated that in total he executed about 170 people, causing fear even among his fellow British mercenaries.4
The truth is that there was no real structure in Georgiou’s force, despite the fact that some men nominally held ranks, and he did not assign command duties. Even for minor disciplinary offenses—real or imagined—some were punished harshly. These punishments and threats were carried out throughout the campaign by many local leaders from each faction and were a common practice applied by Copeland, Christodoulou, and Georgiou.
Naturally, this harsh treatment resulted in volunteers no longer coming forward, as the personnel no longer had confidence in their leadership. On the other hand, it should be noted that the executions occurred when, with the second group of mercenaries—which was of extremely low quality—12 of them were killed while handling weapon systems they had no idea how to operate, and 14 deserted taking the vehicles with them.
From incidents like these it becomes understandable why Georgiou treated his men this way and why he left them little room for initiative. “This is the only law here,” he is reported to have said before executing a recruited man who accidentally fired at a friendly vehicle that he had mistaken for the vanguard of a Cuban escort, intending to instill in his men the belief that no one should take initiative (apparently because of their low level, he did not trust them) and therefore no one would risk mistakes or failures, which he considered the safest and best course of action. Unlike the first group, the second contingent from England consisted of working-class men with no military experience or discipline, simply willing to make easy money. Some did not even know they would be mercenaries.
Operations continued and most were successful. However, their small numbers could not do much against the abundant manpower of the MPLA, reinforced by hundreds or thousands of Cubans and supplied with all kinds of equipment from the Soviet Union. “Colonel Callan” was eventually captured by the MPLA along with several of his men after the failure of a nearly suicidal attack he launched against enemy positions south of Makila. His initial astonishing victories had given him the impression that with his small group of mercenaries he could defeat an enemy many times larger and better equipped.
In the end, Georgiou and 12 others were tried in the famous “Luanda Trial” in June–July 1976. The trial was translated into five languages (Portuguese, Spanish, Russian, French, and English) and broadcast on television to achieve a greater propaganda effect. The outcome was predetermined. On June 28 Georgiou was sentenced to death, which was carried out on July 10. Those executed were Kostas Georgiou, 25 (Cyprus / UK), Andrew Gordon McKenzie, 25 (United Kingdom), Derek John Barker, 35 (United Kingdom), and Daniel Francis Gearhart, 34 (USA).
The latter had been in the country for only three days and had not fired a single shot, and despite interventions even by Kissinger, he was executed. Additionally, three defendants received sentences of 16 years in prison and another three received 24 years. The Argentine-American former Marine Gus Grillo and two others received 30 years. The MPLA did not miss the opportunity to use the trial for propaganda purposes, promoting it as a victory against the West and as the end of the myth of the invincibility of white mercenaries—something which, of course, was not true.
Georgiou’s sister, Panayiota Georgiades, was allowed to visit him during his captivity in Angola. In an interview with the BBC, she said that they mainly talked about their family and the trial, speaking in Greek.
Georgiou’s body was repatriated to England and secretly buried in a cemetery in North London according to the rites of the Greek Orthodox Church.
Sources:
Keating, S., Soldier of Fortune, January 1978 issue and June 1979 issue, published by Susan Katz Keating, Florida, 1978.
Malcher, A., The Mad Dogs of War, IN COMBAT magazine, published by Marshall Cavendish.
Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Asymmetric Conflicts
Interview with Noel Kelly in the Irish daily newspaper “The Irish Times”, December 15, 2000. Interview with Peter McAleese by Rusty Firmin, March 26, 2021.
Oral recorded history of Peter McAleese to Bruce Jones, Imperial War Museum, catalog number 15433, 1995-1996.
- Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Asymmetric Conflicts ,page 102. ↩︎
- as above, page 118. ↩︎
- This was the trigger for Roberto to demote Christodoulou, whom he blamed for the events. A military judge sentenced him to serve 6 months at the front without pay. He died on February 14, 1976 in an enemy ambush. He was accused of killing 167 FNLA members. ↩︎
- The first corps of mercenaries was selected from a British private military company (PMC), led by John Banks, Chris Dempster and Dave Tomkins. Georgiou resented the SAS leadership structure within the company and saw Banks, who remained in Britain, as a personal threat to his position. ↩︎
The rise and fall of the mercenary “Colonel Callan” (summarised)
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Cover photo: During his court defense, Kostas Georgiou consciously took full responsibility for his actions and stated that none of the other accused should be convicted as they were simply following his orders.
Kostas Georgiou was born in Cyprus in 1951, when the island was still under British occupation, and at the age of 12 his family chose to move to London. He enlisted in the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, an elite unit, in Northern Ireland. During his life he faced the IRA, the Marxists of the MPLA in Angola, as well as their Cuban allies who supported them.
He was recognized by his fellow soldiers as one of the unit’s best marksmen, with exceptional physical condition and military training. It is also reported that he participated and fired 26 rounds during “Bloody Sunday,” when more than 30 civilians in Derry were killed or injured. There are also reports that he caused disturbances after exchanging stone-throwing with his friend Nick Hall. A few months later, on February 18, 1972, together with Michael Wayhouse, he robbed a Post Office, after which they were arrested and sentenced to five years in prison and dismissal from the army. Although he later claimed that he was a colonel, Georgiou’s highest rank was that of corporal, and he likely never received officer training.
He was released after two years. In 1975 he worked temporarily in the construction sector. Seeking a better way to make a living, he decided to offer his services as a mercenary. A devotee of adventure and war, he was the first British citizen mercenary to arrive in Angola (on 02.12.75), having previously been recruited by Donald Belford, a former doctor in the British Army, and Colin Taylor as representatives of Holden Roberto’s FNLA.
Officially, Georgiou would work as auxiliary staff in a hospital in the northern part of the country. After Angola’s independence, the organizations were consumed by civil conflict in which the MPLA, receiving help from the Soviets and Cubans, fought the FNLA, which was supported by the CIA. Kostas flew to Angola to arrange all the preparations for himself and his three friends Nick Hall, Michael Wainwright, and Charlie Christodoulou (possibly his cousin), all old friends from the Parachute Regiment.
“Callan” (as he became known), or “Tony Cullen”—the pseudonym he used, taken from a deceased colleague—led a small military group of FNLA fighters as its commander at a time when, in late 1975, the organization was on the verge of collapse. One of them, a Portuguese man named “Madeira,” was a former boxing champion. The Portuguese were essential as translators during the reorganization of FNLA units taking place in São Salvador do Congo. This group consisted of several excellent, experienced soldiers, but they were far too few in number to achieve a decisive victory. The first contingent recruited consisted mainly of unemployed former professional soldiers. The recruits departed from Gatwick Airport to Brussels, where they were given false documents, and from there traveled to Kinshasa, from where they crossed the border.
The rest—especially the local soldiers—had very poor training, and there were communication problems since many of them did not speak English or spoke very little Portuguese (the official language). They had two Land Rovers equipped with 106 mm M40 recoilless rifles, a Panhard M3/VTT APC, an armored Dodge, a Ferret reconnaissance vehicle, a Panhard AML-90 with a 90 mm anti-tank gun, three Land Rovers with Browning .30 machine guns, and one Land Rover with a Goryunov machine gun. Nevertheless, their combat performance during their short campaign was impressive between January 5 and February 6, 1976.1
In a single ambush, on February 3, 1976, against an MPLA convoy, he killed between 60 and 80 of the roughly 600 communist MPLA and Cuban troops, destroyed 3–4 Soviet T-34/54/55 tanks, and four Katyusha rocket launchers—the “Stalin’s organs.” The attack, carried out by a small group of men, relied on surprise. The opposing forces immediately fled in panic, causing no losses to the attackers. Georgiou, “laughing and shouting,” cut down Cubans who were trying to escape from their burning vehicles.2 A few hours later, after finding temporary shelter in the jungle, they carried out a second raid, leaving 40 enemy dead and destroying one tank. Georgiou, a true “dog of war,” with complete disregard for his own safety, ran into the road and tried to kill as many Cubans as possible.
With his group of around 60 men, he continuously inflicted losses on his approximately 1,600 opponents by carrying out repeated ambushes—at least six during this period—applying what he had learned in the British Army. With total losses of about 20 men, he inflicted hundreds of casualties on the enemy and destroyed large amounts of equipment. He was always on the front line and maintained an aggressive spirit in every clash. His activity was so intense and his desire to keep constant pressure on the enemy throughout the day so strong that many of his soldiers could not keep up with him. Impressed by their efforts, Roberto sent Hall back to Britain to recruit a full battalion and also awarded the rank of colonel to “Callan.” To do this, he turned to the services of the private military company Security Advisory Services (SAS), founded by the former paratrooper John Banks and the former robber Dave Tomkins.
Initially successful, the unit began to show signs of disintegration because of Georgiou’s harsh leadership, as he executed 14 of his soldiers for deserting and taking the group’s vehicles with them.3 The British journalist Patrick Brogan described Georgiou as a “psychopathic killer” who executed his 14 mercenaries for cowardice and was extremely brutal toward blacks. On January 31 he executed another 23 who deserted en masse. It was estimated that in total he executed about 170 people, causing fear even among his fellow British mercenaries.4
The truth is that there was no real structure in Georgiou’s force, despite the fact that some men nominally held ranks, and he did not assign command duties. Even for minor disciplinary offenses—real or imagined—some were punished harshly. These punishments and threats were carried out throughout the campaign by many local leaders from each faction and were a common practice applied by Copeland, Christodoulou, and Georgiou.
Naturally, this harsh treatment resulted in volunteers no longer coming forward, as the personnel no longer had confidence in their leadership. On the other hand, it should be noted that the executions occurred when, with the second group of mercenaries—which was of extremely low quality—12 of them were killed while handling weapon systems they had no idea how to operate, and 14 deserted taking the vehicles with them.
From incidents like these it becomes understandable why Georgiou treated his men this way and why he left them little room for initiative. “This is the only law here,” he is reported to have said before executing a recruited man who accidentally fired at a friendly vehicle that he had mistaken for the vanguard of a Cuban escort, intending to instill in his men the belief that no one should take initiative (apparently because of their low level, he did not trust them) and therefore no one would risk mistakes or failures, which he considered the safest and best course of action. Unlike the first group, the second contingent from England consisted of working-class men with no military experience or discipline, simply willing to make easy money. Some did not even know they would be mercenaries.
Operations continued and most were successful. However, their small numbers could not do much against the abundant manpower of the MPLA, reinforced by hundreds or thousands of Cubans and supplied with all kinds of equipment from the Soviet Union. “Colonel Callan” was eventually captured by the MPLA along with several of his men after the failure of a nearly suicidal attack he launched against enemy positions south of Makila. His initial astonishing victories had given him the impression that with his small group of mercenaries he could defeat an enemy many times larger and better equipped.
In the end, Georgiou and 12 others were tried in the famous “Luanda Trial” in June–July 1976. The trial was translated into five languages (Portuguese, Spanish, Russian, French, and English) and broadcast on television to achieve a greater propaganda effect. The outcome was predetermined. On June 28 Georgiou was sentenced to death, which was carried out on July 10. Those executed were Kostas Georgiou, 25 (Cyprus / UK), Andrew Gordon McKenzie, 25 (United Kingdom), Derek John Barker, 35 (United Kingdom), and Daniel Francis Gearhart, 34 (USA).
The latter had been in the country for only three days and had not fired a single shot, and despite interventions even by Kissinger, he was executed. Additionally, three defendants received sentences of 16 years in prison and another three received 24 years. The Argentine-American former Marine Gus Grillo and two others received 30 years. The MPLA did not miss the opportunity to use the trial for propaganda purposes, promoting it as a victory against the West and as the end of the myth of the invincibility of white mercenaries—something which, of course, was not true.
Georgiou’s sister, Panayiota Georgiades, was allowed to visit him during his captivity in Angola. In an interview with the BBC, she said that they mainly talked about their family and the trial, speaking in Greek.
Georgiou’s body was repatriated to England and secretly buried in a cemetery in North London according to the rites of the Greek Orthodox Church.
Sources:
Keating, S., Soldier of Fortune, January 1978 issue and June 1979 issue, published by Susan Katz Keating, Florida, 1978.
Malcher, A., The Mad Dogs of War, IN COMBAT magazine, published by Marshall Cavendish.
Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Asymmetric Conflicts
Interview with Noel Kelly in the Irish daily newspaper “The Irish Times”, December 15, 2000. Interview with Peter McAleese by Rusty Firmin, March 26, 2021.
Oral recorded history of Peter McAleese to Bruce Jones, Imperial War Museum, catalog number 15433, 1995-1996.
- Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Asymmetric Conflicts ,page 102. ↩︎
- as above, page 118. ↩︎
- This was the trigger for Roberto to demote Christodoulou, whom he blamed for the events. A military judge sentenced him to serve 6 months at the front without pay. He died on February 14, 1976 in an enemy ambush. He was accused of killing 167 FNLA members. ↩︎
- The first corps of mercenaries was selected from a British private military company (PMC), led by John Banks, Chris Dempster and Dave Tomkins. Georgiou resented the SAS leadership structure within the company and saw Banks, who remained in Britain, as a personal threat to his position. ↩︎