Cover photo: During his court defense, Kostas Georgiou consciously took full responsibility for his actions and stated that none of the other accused should be convicted as they were simply following his orders.

..He gathered his men and asked, “Who threw at the armored vehicle?” A young man, 20-year-old Phil Davis, took a step forward and said, “I did, sir.” Then, Georgiou stood in front of him and shot him in the leg with his pistol. He then angrily paced around, and when he stood in front of him again, he shot him again, this time in the shoulder. After another outburst in front of all his astonished soldiers, he gave him the coup de grâce shot to the head. Along with the unfortunate young man, there were 13 other soldiers who, besides the incident with the friendly fire on the Land Rover, had expressed their desire to leave the war and return to their homeland, and had indeed prepared with supplies to desert to Zaire.

As soon as Georgiou was informed of this by Coupland, the latter ordered them to drop their weapons and remove their uniforms. Then, Coupland put them in a truck, drove them to a remote jungle location, and executed them. Upon hearing of the events, Roberto ordered the arrest of Christodoulos and Coupland. The latter was executed after a brief court-martial. He also tasked mercenary Peter McAleese with arresting Georgiou, but the men he assigned to him deserted.

Despite the irreparable shock in the mercenary unit (it should be noted that the previous day, another 23 FNLA auxiliary soldiers who had sabotaged their vehicles by pouring sugar into the fuel tanks to avoid following Georgiou on his missions were executed), operations continued, and with unexpected success. On February 3, 1976, he caused real chaos in enemy lines. The attack, carried out by a small group of men numbering no more than 25, relied on surprise. With a purely aggressive spirit, he personally led a frontal assault on his men, ordering them to empty one magazine after another towards the general direction of the enemy, giving the impression that they had much greater firepower. The opponents fled in panic without causing any losses to the attackers. It is estimated that on that day, Georgiou’s unit killed 60 to 80 of the approximately 600 FAPLA and Cuban communists, destroyed 3 to 4 Soviet T-34/54/55 battle tanks, and 4 Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, Stalin’s Organs.

After the initial attack, Georgiou and his men found temporary refuge in a relatively safe location in the jungle, setting up a new ambush not far from the initial point. The enemy, thinking the area was safe and trying to reorganize, relaxed their defenses, resulting in them suffering another deadly attack, causing 40 casualties and having 1 T-34 battle tank destroyed. Georgiou, a true “war dog,” with absolute disregard for his own safety, ran uncovered on the road laughing and shouting (!) trying to kill as many Cubans as possible, mowing them down as they tried to escape from their burning vehicles. With minimal rest for him and his men, he set up a new ambush on a rugged road where enemy troops passed by.

The phalanx attacked and destroyed 3 Soviet-made armored vehicles as well as 2 trucks carrying approximately 80 soldiers. Despite his men being on the verge of collapse, he attempted to launch a new attack, this time at night. However, the Cubans and FAPLA fighters anticipated it and had now understood (after 3 attacks on the same day and 2 the previous week) the method of the “Kallan’s” assault. This time, they held their positions under the initial devastating fire from the mercenaries, and over time, with their numerical and material superiority, the tide turned in their favor.

An additional factor was an unexpected explosion from an ammunition-laden vehicle that Georgiou hit with an anti-tank rocket, causing many casualties on both sides and shaking the morale of the mercenaries. Eventually, Cuban and FAPLA forces finally repelled Georgiou, who was injured in one leg, from whose section they killed about half of the men—10 to 15—and drove the rest into retreat.

Regardless of whether the casualty figures are accurate or not (3), as identifying them in such wars is extremely difficult, Georgiou, with his approximately 60-man unit, continuously inflicted damage on around 1,600-2,000 opponents, applying whatever he gleaned from the British army, and elevated his reputation within the FNLA ranks. With total losses of around 20 men, he caused multiple casualties and significant material damage. He was always on the front lines and always maintained an aggressive spirit in every confrontation.

His activity was so intense and his desire for constant pressure on the enemy all day, every day, that many of his soldiers could not bear to follow him. Testimonies from his soldiers indicate that Georgiou was an excellent leader during battles, with clear orders, an ideal small leader to inspire the others with his example in the attack. All battles and clashes won by the FNLA side were a result of the presence of “Kallan” and the direct command he exercised. Impressed by their efforts, Roberto, who had seen his army counting only failures since November, sent Hohl back to Britain to recruit a full regiment and also bestowed the rank of Colonel on “Kallan”.

Despite the small tactical successes, the unit began to show signs of dissolution due to Georgiou’s harsh leadership. It was estimated that he executed approximately 170 FNLA personnel (!), in addition to the 14 British, causing terror even among his European mercenary colleagues. Another reason was that there was no real structure in Georgiou’s force, despite some men having nominal ranks, and the fact that he did not assign any command duties, while even minor disciplinary infractions, real or imaginary, were harshly punished. These continuous punishments and threats were carried out throughout the campaign by many local leaders from every faction and constituted a common practice applied by Coupland, Christodoulos, and Georgiou. No one else dared to assume a leadership role or even take any initiatives for fear of the consequences if something went wrong.

Of course, this harsh treatment resulted in no more volunteers coming forward, as the personnel no longer trusted their leaders. On the contrary, it should be noted that the executions took place with the arrival of the second body of mercenaries (arriving on January 20, 1976, while the third body arrived on January 31), which was of extremely low quality: 12 of them were killed or injured when handling weapons they had no idea about, and another 14 deserted, taking the vehicles with them.

In contrast to the first body, the second and third bodies from England consisted of working-class men without military experience or discipline, individuals from the criminal justice system, gymnasts, cooks, truck drivers who were simply eager to make easy money. Some didn’t even know they would be mercenaries. This fact exclusively burdened the recruitment officer John Banks, who had a particularly bad reputation since all he cared about was sending people to Angola, being paid “£250 per head”. Thus, from a certain point onwards, he described to them an ideal prevailing situation in Angola regarding forces, armament, and the FNLA’s condition.

In total, 143-200 mercenaries, depending on the source, participated to a lesser or greater extent in the Angolan civil war, with 26-40 of them meeting their deaths (including the 14 executed and the later 4 sentenced to death), others wounded, and 9 taken prisoner.

Their small numbers couldn’t do much against the abundant human resources of the FAPLA, the reinforcements from thousands of Cubans, and the diverse equipment from the Soviet Union. “Colonel Callan” was captured on February 6, 1976, by the FAPLA along with several of his men after an almost suicidal attack that started with only 22 men (!) against enemy positions with over ten times as many opponents south of Maquela, in the town of Quibocolo. His initial remarkable victories created the impression that with the small group of mercenaries, he could continually defeat the many times larger and better-equipped enemy.

“The Trial of Luanda”.

For the fate of the mercenary prisoners, a People’s Revolutionary Court was established, consisting of 6 judges, two of whom were soldiers, and one woman from the Women’s Organization of Angola, essentially the MPLA’s women’s political wing. The prisoners were charged with crimes against peace, humanity, and Angola and were initially questioned about their ideological beliefs, but received nothing but bewildered expressions from the fighters. It was clear that these men had only one motive: financial rewards – which they never received -: £300 per week for officers, £200 per week for non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and a “bonus” of £25,000 for anyone who managed to capture a Soviet soldier.

The trial was translated into five languages (Portuguese, Spanish, Russian, French, and English), had observers from the USA, UK, Canada, and the Soviet Union, and was broadcast on television to achieve greater propaganda results. Georgios’s sister, Panagiota Georgiadis, was allowed to be visited during his captivity in Angola. In an interview with the BBC, he said they mainly talked about their families and the trial, speaking in Greek. In court, Georgios took full responsibility for his actions, showing no signs of fear or remorse, something that was also acknowledged by the famous mercenary and soldier from Scotland, Peter McAleese.

Indeed, he tried to exonerate his fellow comrades from the heavy charges. He stated, “So, what I have to say is this and I want it to be recorded, that all the men who have been captured, the so-called mercenaries, MacKenzie (Andrew Gordon MacKenzie, one of the accused) was not number two in the hierarchy, okay? And all the others from the soldiers you have captured were under my direct command, so any responsibility and any charge against them… They followed my orders, they were just soldiers. That’s all I have to say and I don’t want to answer any more questions.”

On June 28, Georgios was sentenced to death and executed on July 10. The executed defendants were from the United Kingdom: Kostas Georgiou, 25 years old, Andrew Gordon McKenzie, 25 years old, Derek John Barker, 35 years old, and the American Daniel Francis Gearhart, 34 years old. The latter had been in the country for only 3 days and did not fire a single shot, yet despite interventions, even from Kissinger, he was executed. Additionally, 3 defendants received 16-year prison sentences, and another 3 received 24 years. The Argentine-American former marine Gus Grillo and 2 others received 30-year prison sentences. The MPLA did not miss the opportunity to use the trial for propaganda purposes, promoting it as a victory against the West and as the end of the myth of the invincible white mercenaries.

The assessment of Georgios’s overall actions in Angola, despite the short time span, left a significant impact and was extensively commented on by significant figures. The head of the CIA in Angola, John Stockwell, said of Georgios, “He was a psychopath. A raging psychopath, and some of the men alongside him were also psychopaths.” Regardless of whether he was right, he failed to mention that at the CIA’s urging, Georgios took charge, and indeed, with the phrase from CIA officials to Robert “this is what you need and a thousand like him.”

On the other hand, the head of the FNLA, Holden Roberto, praised the Greek-Cypriot mercenary in a later interview: “Among the mercenaries were some very capable soldiers, ‘Callan,’ for example, I don’t know if I have ever seen such a soldier again, he had unprecedented courage. However, perhaps he was too young, he was only 25 years old and I gave him a lot of power and he couldn’t control it.” The opinion of both is summarized by the high-ranking soldier Peter McAleese: “I’ve met many men, but in the case of ‘Callan,’ I felt very uneasy, not at all comfortable. He had a lot of balls, but he was an uncontrollable individual, a dangerously uncontrollable person.”

Georgios’s body was repatriated to England and was secretly buried on July 26, 1976, in a cemetery in North London according to the ceremonies of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Footnotes

(3) In his memoirs, the local Cuban leader in one of the ambushes of the mercenaries, Gonzalo del Valle Céspedes, mentions a very small number of losses on their side. Nevertheless, he cannot ignore significant losses such as Lieutenant Colonel Corneliú Dúran Castillo, who was killed in the ambush on February 3rd. In contrast, in an interview with Soldier of Fortune magazine, June 1979 issue, Chris Dempster, also a former paratrooper in Georgiou’s unit, notes that the leader of the Cuban forces, Victor Carreras, confirms the heavy losses suffered in clashes with the mercenaries. The writer’s opinion is that the truth regarding the numbers lies somewhere in the middle, as the advance of the Cubans/FAPLA from the town of Damba to Maquela was significantly delayed (from January 21st to February 5th), indicating the resistance encountered and the undeniable temporary success of the mercenaries.

(4) McAleese has an exceptionally rich biography, having served in the 1st Parachute Regiment, then in the 22nd SAS Regiment, and again with the Parachute Regiment, passing through Yemen, Bahrain, Cyprus, and Borneo. He was imprisoned after convictions for violence, and upon his release, he took charge of the remnants of the mercenaries after Georgiou’s capture. He then went to Rhodesia, where he fought serving in the Rhodesian SAS, and after the fall of Rhodesia, in the 44th Parachute Brigade of South Africa.

Bibliography

Fontanellaz A. and Cooper T., War of Intervention in Angola, Vol. 1, Angolan and Cuban Forces at War, published by Helion & Company Limited, Warwick, 2018.

Keating, S., Soldier of Fortune, January 1978 issue and June 1979 issue, published by Susan Katz Keating, Florida, 1978.

Malcher, A., The Mad Dogs of War, IN COMBAT magazine, published by Marshall Cavendish.

Scott, F., Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

Tomkins, D., Dirty Combat: Secret Wars and Serious Misadventures, published by Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 2008.

Venter, A., Mercenaries: Putting the World to Rights with Hired Guns, published by CASEMATE PUBLISHERS, Oxford, 2014.

Audiovisual material from the archive of the news agency “The Associated Press (AP)”.

Interview with Noel Kelly in the Irish daily newspaper “The Irish Times”, December 15, 2000. Interview with Peter McAleese by Rusty Firmin, March 26, 2021.

Oral recorded history of Peter McAleese to Bruce Jones, Imperial War Museum, catalog number 15433, 1995-1996.