Cover photo: George coordinates his department during the operations.

The unfortunate outcome in the British Army and the outbreak of civil war in Angola.

Costas Georgiou was born in Cyprus in 1951, when the island was still under British rule, and at the age of 12, his family chose to move to London. He enlisted in the 1st Parachute Regiment, an elite unit, in Northern Ireland. Recognized by his comrades as one of the best marksmen in the unit with exceptional physical condition and military training, Georgiou faced the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Irish Democratic Army. According to Noel Kelly, an eyewitness who was 18 at the time, during the events of “Bloody Sunday” on January 30, 1972, in Derry, where 14 people were killed and over 15 injured, Georgiou was one of the soldiers who opened fire on the unarmed crowd. Reports suggest that he was partially responsible—him and his friend Nick Hall—for provoking the incidents after an exchange of stone throwing with the protesters. Subsequently, Georgiou fired at the crowd at least 26 times, contributing to the chaos of that bloody day for Ireland.

Disregarding any notion of danger and lawful life, just a few weeks later, on February 18, 1972, along with Michael Waynehouse and a few more colleagues, he robbed a local post office in Ulster only to be arrested later and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment and dishonorable discharge. In the British Army, Georgiou’s highest rank was that of a lance corporal and he probably never received officer training. After serving his sentence, he was released and in 1975 he was temporarily employed in the construction sector.

Seeking a better way to make a living, he decided to offer his services as a mercenary. During that period, he began a relationship with a Greek Cypriot, Rona Angelou, whose cousin was Charlie Christodoulou, another Greek Cypriot paratrooper, but unlike Georgiou, he had been honorably discharged from the army with distinguished service. Fate would bring the two men to the battlefields of Angola where they would meet the same fate.

On January 15, 1975, the Alvor Agreement was signed in Portugal, granting independence to Angola from Portugal. In addition to the Portuguese government, the “last colonial empire” as it was often called, the agreement was signed by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA-Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA-Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA-Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola).

The three major factions in the country, following the signing of the agreement and the appointment of a transitional government, understood the necessity of acquiring external support as they fully entered the path towards political dominance through warfare. Despite the ambitious intentions of some individuals for a peaceful transition towards internal political stability, the first cracks began to form from the minor clashes that took place in March 1975. A new reconciliation effort, the “Nakuru Agreement” on June 21, ultimately proved to be a fragile truce lasting only three weeks. Every semblance of cooperation shattered in July 1975 when MPLA violently forced FNLA out of Luanda, and UNITA voluntarily retreated to its stronghold in the South. By August, MPLA controlled 11 out of 15 provincial capitals, including Cabinda and Luanda.

MPLA, a Marxist political entity centered in the capital, Luanda, led by Agostinho Neto, consistently received assistance in all forms of material from the Soviets, including light weapons, tanks, other vehicles, artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and various ammunition. Additionally, within a short timeframe, 12-18,000 Cuban troops arrived, significantly contributing to MPLA’s dominance. FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, based in the northern part of the country, had strong ties with Zaire, a US ally, as well as the People’s Republic of China. It received primarily economic aid and light weaponry from the latter but to a lesser extent compared to MPLA, and had considerably fewer fighters. UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, was supported by the largest ethnic group in the country, the Ovimbundu, and forces from South Africa.

Back to Georgiou, being an enthusiast of adventure and war with bleak prospects for stable employment due to his criminal record, he was among the first British citizens to arrive in Angola (on 02.12.75), having previously been hired by Donald Belford, a former British Army medic, and Colin Taylor, who represented FNLA under Holden Roberto. Initially, Georgiou participated in the conflict as auxiliary personnel in a hospital in the northern part of the country and distinguished himself for his courage in leading CASEVAC ambulances into the line of fire, as well as for his inexhaustible activity. As cities fell one after the other into the hands of FAPLA (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola, the armed wing of MPLA), Georgiou reluctantly followed FNLA forces as they retreated.

This continued until one day, in the town of Negage, which was expected to fall into enemy hands any day, he decided that he wouldn’t leave unless he fired a few shots at the enemy for the honor of the weapons. Ultimately, he achieved something better. Alongside some Portuguese mercenaries, they approached the unsuspecting enemy sections of the 9th Brigade of FAPLA, who were awaiting orders to seize the town. Suddenly, they were hit by a hail of bullets from Georgiou’s and the Portuguese’s machine guns, as well as some anti-tank rounds from light anti-tank M72s of the 66 mm. The results were catastrophic. Dozens of FAPLA soldiers lay dead or wounded, both from enemy fire and from several Katyusha rocket launchers, which, having ignited, fired their rockets in every direction.

When the city finally fell, Georgiou and some Portuguese had already flown to Zaire, where they met Christodoulos, Hohl, and Wainsaw. The recruitment of the remaining mercenaries was carried out by former paratrooper John Banks, who owned the private military company Security Advisory Services (SAS) based in Surrey’s Campbell, former paratrooper thief Dave Tomkins, and Hohl, who maintained contacts with old comrades from the paratroopers, individuals from the criminal justice system. In the second phase, builders, workers, carpenters, and other men seeking higher wages were hired. Advertisements such as “Former paratroopers, SAS men, and Marines wanted for interesting work abroad. Phone: Campbell 33456,” appeared in many newspapers in an attempt to attract professional adventurers. Volunteers flew to Kinshasa and then to designated points near the Angola-Zaire borders, where they were equipped with a plethora of weapons that were available, but mostly of poor quality or outdated.

The bloody journey of “Callan”. Bold victories and executions.

The situation Georgiou faced from the moment he arrived in the country was characterized by only one word: chaos. The recent defeat of the FNLA at Quifangondo (November 10, 1975) and the failure to capture the capital Luanda, combined with the rapid influx of Cubans on the MPLA side, led Roberto’s forces from defeat to defeat. The concept of medical care for civilians and combatants was unknown, and there was a great shortage of war supplies and all kinds of supplies, even for daily rations. As the head of the CIA in Angola, John Stockwell, stated, there was no mention of adequate issues of administrative care, organization, and accounting support.(1)

The widespread corruption in the army ranks, with the looting of food intended for the already suffering citizens, worsened the above situation. In the field of battle, the morally weakened FNLA with about 5,000 men tried with nails and teeth to hold the remaining cities of the north, Damba, Quiboolo, Sao Salvador, Maquela, and San Antonio do Zaire, against 9-14,000 Cubans and another 20,000 FAPLA soldiers. Georgiou, or more commonly known as nom du guerre “Callan” (as prevailed) or “Tony Coolen” by a deceased colleague, was now the leader of a small military group of FNLA fighters, after prompting from CIA officials to Roberto. He was surrounded by some old colleagues from the Paratrooper Constitution, such as Sam Coupland (or “Sammy”), Mick Waynehouse, Chris Dempster, and also the Greek Cypriot Charlie Christodoulou, or otherwise known as “Shotgun Charlie”.

Georgiou asked to have Portuguese with him – one of them named “Madeira” and was a former boxing champion – as they were necessary as translators in the reorganization of the FNLA sections taking place in Sao Salvador do Congo. The first group hired consisted mainly of unemployed former professional soldiers. The recruits boarded from Gatwick Airport to Brussels, where they received fake documents and then left for Kinshasa, from where they crossed the borders. This section, called “Kallan’s mercenaries,” consisted of excellent and experienced soldiers, but very few in numbers to achieve a decisive victory. To understand the difference in numbers, “Kallan” never had under direct command more than 60-70 mercenaries and a few hundred locals as assistants. With them, he had to face 2,000 opponents from the FAPLA and Cuba, equipped with 20 T-34/54/55 battle tanks, artillery, multiple BM-21 rocket launchers, at least 6 TOMA (Armored Combat Vehicles) BRDM-2 and TOBP (Armored Personnel Carriers) BTR-60, and other equipment.

In addition to the mercenaries, some local soldiers with very poor training (1) were incorporated, and there was a communication issue as many of them did not speak English or spoke minimal Portuguese (the official language). However, they were necessary as drivers and scouts since they knew the areas of operations. Kallan’s men had two Land Rovers equipped with 106mm M40 anti-tank guns, armored Panhard M3/VTT, an armored Dodge, a reconnaissance Ferret, a Panhard AML-90 with a 90mm anti-tank gun, 3 Land Rovers with 0.30-inch Brownings, and a Land Rover with a Goryunova machine gun. The vehicles were mainly used as transportation for the men rather than in the battlefield. They were equipped with a variety of rifles M1, M2, FN, AK-47, AKM, Sternilg, submachine guns Uzi and Sten, and 4 M76 grenade launchers for individual armament.

There was no clear hierarchy scale other than Georgiou’s leadership, the appointment of team leaders made by his own estimation and choice, the assignment of ranks to them again by him, and in cases of hesitation or differing opinions on his orders, they were enforced by continuous threats. “You’ll get used to it,” the elders said to the newcomers entering his section. Especially among the colored fighters, “Kallan” had the right of life and death over them, taking away the lives of many of them several times for violation or non-execution of his orders.

As indicative examples, in one of the ambushes he set up on January 24, 1976, he clearly stated to his men that he would personally execute them if they abandoned their positions, and in another instance, he executed 21 FNLA men on the day they arrived for disobedience and rebellion. Soon, the European fighters would realize that the same would apply to them.

Despite the vast difference in firepower, their combat performance in their brief campaign was impressive during the period from January 24 to February 6, 1976, with involvement in at least 3 battles and several smaller skirmishes and ambushes. Georgiou relied mainly on the element of surprise, as his limited forces left him with little room for other types of operations. One of his main disadvantages was the fact that he did not allow anyone initiative in the operational aspect, usually due to the distrust of the existing, apart from the aforementioned, colleagues from the Parachute Regiment. There was no training for incoming members, and the specialization of some personnel in certain areas, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), was solely based on their previous life experiences.

On January 24, Georgiou set up a poorly planned and organized ambush against about 40 men and 3 Cuban/FAPLA tanks in an open field, resulting in the otherwise panicked enemy easily escaping. The Cubans unleashed a barrage of artillery and multiple rocket launchers from the BM-21, but they were desperately inaccurate. The Greek Cypriot seized the opportunity, pursued the enemy with several jeeps equipped with 106mm Recoilless Rifles and caused 21 enemy casualties.

On February 2, 1976, he attacked unexpectedly a section of Cubans/FAPLA. The latter, accustomed to walking uncovered, with their tanks at low speed and driving away the untrained fighters of the FNLA, suffered a defeat when they received accurate fire from the anti-tank weapons and light weapons of the mercenaries led by the Greek Cypriot leader, leaving behind a three-digit number of dead and wounded (160-200 men), in contrast to a few wounded on the ‘Kallan’ side. It is worth noting that during the operations, the MPLA/Cubans suffered several losses from the skillful placement of anti-tank mines and from improvised mines on a personal basis with Soviet-style hand grenades POMZ-2 of the notorious British mercenary Dave Tompkins, who spent most of the 1960s behind the bars of British prisons as his… expertise was blowing up safes.(2)

However, one day earlier, on February 1, 1976, an event occurred that shocked the FNLA and the mercenary force: the execution of 14 British mercenaries by the ‘Kallan’ corps. According to eyewitness Lewis Elford, the events unfolded as follows. Some of his men, in Georgiou’s absence, spotted a vehicle moving towards their direction and immediately took up battle positions. Assuming it was a Cuban armored vehicle, they opened fire, but to their misfortune, it was a Land Rover in which Coupland was traveling with some of his men, who were seriously injured. At that moment, Georgiou returned to the scene, already in a nervous state because he had been forced to go to other parts of the front for no reason as false reports of front disintegration existed. When he was informed about the Land Rover incident, initially he didn’t say much, but he was clearly beside himself.”

Footnotes

(1)The descriptions that indicate the majority of FNLA personnel had no idea how to properly use the systems and vehicles they operated, including individual weapons supplied with incorrect caliber ammunition, are characteristic. According to McAleese, this was due to the fact that during their stay and training by the Chinese in Zaire, they “spent their time on stupid communist slogans rather than weapons training, with which they probably had not even fired a shot.” It is worth noting that a similar level of training prevailed on the opposing side, both in FAPLA forces and among the Cubans, although the situation with the latter was slightly better.

(2) When later asked why he went to Angola, he replied: “It sounded like a good idea at the time… (The man who offered me the job), if he had told me to go to Mars, I would have said ‘yes’. Within 48 hours, I had a gun in my hand and I was in Angola.” After Angola, he established himself as a weapons dealer and took on many offers of death contracts, such as for the President of Togo and the leader of Uganda, Idi Amin, the headquarters of the FARC guerrilla group in 1988 (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Pablo Escobar in 1989, etc.

Bibliography/Sources

Fontanellaz A. and Cooper T., War of Intervention in Angola, Vol. 1, Angolan and Cuban Forces at War, published by Helion & Company Limited, Warwick, 2018.

Keating, S., Soldier of Fortune, January 1978 issue and June 1979 issue, published by Susan Katz Keating, Florida, 1978.

Malcher, A., The Mad Dogs of War, IN COMBAT magazine, published by Marshall Cavendish.

Scott, F., Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

Tomkins, D., Dirty Combat: Secret Wars and Serious Misadventures, published by Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 2008.

Venter, A., Mercenaries: Putting the World to Rights with Hired Guns, published by CASEMATE PUBLISHERS, Oxford, 2014.

Audiovisual material from the archive of the news agency “The Associated Press (AP)”.

Interview with Noel Kelly in the Irish daily newspaper “The Irish Times”, December 15, 2000. Interview with Peter McAleese by Rusty Firmin, March 26, 2021.

Oral recorded history of Peter McAleese to Bruce Jones, Imperial War Museum, catalog number 15433, 1995-1996.