Cover photo : Ottoman Stormtroopes at WW1.

The Stormtrooper units, in a free translation meaning “shock troops,” and in German known as Sturmtruppen or Stoßtruppen, constituted the special forces of the German and not only the army. They were trained and operated in new infiltration tactics that were part of the improved German method of attacking enemy trenches. This resulted from the limited success of previous operations, especially on the Western Front. Relentless artillery barrages on enemy positions, infantry assaults often ending in a bloodbath, minimal to zero territorial gains, and a situation in stalemate.

The idea was formed in the minds of Major Calsow and Hauptmann (captain) Willy Rohr in the spring of 1915. However, the philosophy of developing such units was not a “German monopoly.” French Captain André Laffargue, also in 1915, developed the idea of identifying and crushing the enemy’s weak points and dealing with the difficulties posed by subsequent and basic waves of infantry. Although his views did not gain much traction, they gradually gained consideration and were informally adopted, with the Canadian Army being a pioneer. The British rejected them and emphasized firepower. The prospect was as follows: carefully selected volunteer soldiers would be trained in small-scale attacks at crucial points. Engineers’ soldiers were preferred. These men would carry out raiding attacks, silently approaching the enemy’s trenches and traversing the no man’s land. The equipment they received included wire cutters for the barbed wire, light machine guns, flamethrowers, bayonets, many hand grenades, and many of them wore metal armor. (1)

The formation of a stormtrooper unit was ordered and implemented by Enver Pasha, the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire, in July 1917. In May of the same year, a group of officers and non-commissioned officers received training in these assault techniques in Dublyany, Ukraine. The first soldiers sent for training were in extremely poor condition, of advanced age, and with tattered uniforms. Suitable personnel were selected from other units. With the assistance of German and Austro-Hungarian instructors, the troops were trained in the use of flamethrowers and 7.58 cm Minenwerfer mortars.

Additionally, Ottoman troops, who never wore metal helmets, received German M1916 helmets with a variation, as the length of the visors was reduced because it was considered difficult to hear orders on the battlefield. In Turkish terminology, the units were called “Hucum Taburu/Mufrezesi/Kita,” where Taburu is the regiment, Mufreze is the battalion, and Kita is the group. Training took place in Maltepe, Istanbul, until the end of the war. Although there are no additional references, it is considered certain that many of them participated in the war against Greece during the Asia Minor Campaign.

During the Middle Eastern theatre of World War I, especially in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign, the Ottomans employed the stormtrooper units as part of the Yıldırım (Thunderbolt) Army Group, utilizing the latest infiltration tactics from the Western Front, combined with the firepower of rifles and machine guns. These units were part of the 19th and 20th Divisions, trained in Galicia. A notable action of this unit took place in the Battle of El Burj on December 1, 1917, when units of the Australian Light Horse withdrew from their defensive positions on a ridgeline but halted and became isolated when British reinforcements arrived.

In a report by the Australian Gullet, the following is recounted: “After a period of absolute silence, which was the greatest strain on the nerves of the defenders from the battle itself, about 500 Turks, with strong cries of ‘Allah,’ rushed the hill. The Australians held their composure until the first enemy men were within twenty yards, then greeted them with intense fire from rifles and Hotchkiss machine guns, simultaneously bombarding them effectively. Responding, the Turks bravely charged forward in a desperate attempt to bring their vastly superior numbers into a hand-to-hand struggle with the Australians.”

But the Victorians fought with admirable steadiness, holding the enemy when 48 men of the Gloucestershire Regiment (…) and a few minutes later, a group of the Royal Scots Fusiliers under Lieutenant Colonel Stuart-Richardson also rushed to ascend the hill and joined the battle. (…) Subsequently, it was learned that the attacking force was a stormtrooper unit selected in Galicia (modern-day Ukraine) from the 19th and 20th Divisions, specifically trained by German officers. Naturally, they were the best Turks that the Australians had encountered during the war.
Despite the gradual retreat, the Ottomans maintained their defensive line sometimes with successful results.

One of these defensive successes occurred during the Allied Second Offensive in Transjordan in May 1918 at Shunet Nimrin, where a stormtrooper unit distinguished itself in battle by defeating the British/Australian and New Zealand cavalry. In this attack on May 1, the Ottoman 143rd Infantry Regiment, a stormtrooper unit with 2 German infantry companies and a machine gun company, swiftly moved across the open field under artillery fire to reach the lines of the 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments and an artillery battery. Despite heavy losses and continuous and relentless pressure from three points, the Ottomans and Germans forced their opponents to abandon the artillery and horses and escape, for those who could, through a dangerous and steep rocky path.

Forces of the attacking side continued the pursuit and captured another crucial hill, the “Red Hill,” forcing the withdrawal of the 11th Light Horse Regiment and the remaining men of the 4th. With continuous pressure even during the night, the Ottomans seized yet another position. The battle continued at other points on the field until May 4. What impressed the allied forces regarding the movements on May 1 was the speed and momentum of the attacking units despite the losses (overall, the British and allies had 1,649 casualties, while the Ottomans/Germans had about 2,500 but managed to repel the allied attack).

Notes:
(1)Gerhard Gruhaber, “The German Spirit in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938: A History of Military Knowledge,” De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p. 86.
(2)HS Gullett, “Sinai and Palestine,” Chapter XXIX, Nahr Auja and El Burj, pp. 504-509.

Sources/Bibliography:

Twitter/Fatih Bas, MapperKrumm, Polat Safi.

Gerhard Gruhaber, «The German Spirit in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938: A History of Military Knowledge», De Gruyter Oldenbourg.

HS Gullett, «Sinai and Palestine».

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