Cover photo: Sowjetunion, Kaukasus.- Deutsche Gebirgsjäger im Schnee, Rast; PK 666
(22 December 1942; German Federal Archives)
The Operation ‘Samil’ was a plan by the German armed forces to occupy the cities of Maikop and Grozny. The operation involved the airdrop of special forces units behind enemy lines, capturing key points, while the main force would advance to reach them. Named after Imam Shamil, the operation was part of the German Army’s summer offensive in 1942, with the main objective being the occupation of the major oil-producing cities, Maikop primarily, and ultimately Baku.
The execution of the plan involved the special operations unit of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Haehling von Lanzenauer, ‘Brandenburg Regiment zBV 800.’ It was a unit where ‘the first requirement for someone to join was voluntarism, followed by agility and the ability to react quickly, improvisational skills, a high degree of initiative combined with a strong sense of camaraderie. Additionally, a certain but disciplined thirst for adventure, skill in dealing with foreign peoples, and, of course, final performance. Certainly, a dignified external presence was desirable, and linguistic skills would allow a man to convincingly appear as a British officer or a soldier of the Red Army.’
The battle interpreters were almost always locals from the operational area, most of whom had undergone military training in their countries of origin and often possessed high qualifications. In this particular case, they constituted the majority of the mission, with a detailed breakdown of 15 Germans, 21 Ossetians, 16 Ingush, 13 Chechens, 5 Dagestanis, 3 Circassians, one Russian, and one Cossack. It is noteworthy regarding discipline and the quality of soldiers that there is no official evidence or report of war crimes, even when these men operated in areas with intense guerrilla activity, where the nature of war was particularly harsh, leading both sides to almost constant extremes.
The unit would conduct an airdrop behind the advancing 1st Panzer Army. There, they would establish contact with local irregular friendly forces, seize the oil fields with the element of surprise, and defend them against any damage or destruction by the retreating Red Army. However, as is often the case, the plan deviated once the operation commenced.
A small group landed behind Soviet lines on August 25 near Duba-Yurt, in the gorge of the Argun River in the south of Grozny, an area inhabited by Chechens. The unit moved northwest towards the spearheads of the advancing German forces. Along the way, they attempted to incite the largely Muslim populations of the Caucasus, such as Chechen groups led by Hasan Israilov, to launch attacks on the rear of Soviet troops or local uprisings. As part of this, the Chechen and German special forces advisors had to strategically occupy points and prevent the movement of Soviet forces, which they succeeded in doing. The surprise was complete, and after brief battles, the Grozny oil fields were in German hands.
Shortly after the airdrop, the ‘Brandenburg’ unit engaged in clashes with Soviet forces, and by September 12, they were forced to retreat due to the resistance of Soviet militia and NKVD units, heading south towards the village of Borzoi, where friendly Chechen resistance fighters were located. Another reason was the small number of fighters, as only 57 men were deployed during the August-September period, with another 20 in a second drop. After continuing to the village of Oschnoi, deeper into the Caucasus, the unit regrouped on September 25 to start its march northwest towards German lines. At this stage of the operation, they managed to avoid encirclement and destruction by Soviet forces on three occasions. By then, German forces had already halted their advance, reaching 55 miles (89 kilometers) outside Grozny.
During this period, the German command was in contact with two Chechen resistance groups, whose members were more than willing to fight against the Soviets. However, this specific segment of “Samil” failed not due to a lack of willingness to cooperate between the Germans and the Chechens but due to the poor equipment of the latter, resulting in objectively limited capabilities. Consequently, this part of the operation failed. Ultimately, the German unit “Brandenburger” spent 3.5 months fighting on foreign soil, engaging in 4 battles/engagements, avoiding enemy traps and encirclement attempts, covering 550 kilometers through Soviet lines. On December 10, the “Brandenburger” unit finally made contact with other German forces in the village of Verchny Kurp.
The NKVD secret police quickly learned details about Operation “Samil,” which was one of the reasons for the deportation of the entire population of Chechens and Ingush to Central Asia and the dissolution of the autonomous republic of Chechen-Ingushetia as part of the USSR on March 7, 1944.
The unit changed its name from November 20, 1942, to “Sonderverband Brandenburg” and from April 1, 1943, to “Brandenburg Division.”
Sources
https://www.axishistory.com/books/154-germany-heer/heer-regimenter/4476-lehr-regiment-brandenburg-zbv-800
batsav.com
https://www.bundesarchiv.de/DE/Content/Virtuelle-Ausstellungen/Die-Brandenburger-Kommandotruppe-Und-Frontverband/die-brandenburger-kommandotruppe-und-frontverband.html
https://portal.ehri-project.eu/units/de-002525-rh_26_1002
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_(Spezialeinheit)
https://codenames.info/operation/schamil/
Twitter/Caucasus Archives.