Photo cover: The Cossacks fightingTatars of the Crimean Khanate – Painting by Brant Joseph (1845-1910), 1890.

The Tatars constituted a significant part of the Ottoman army during the 17th and 18th centuries, especially as light irregular cavalry. They played a role similar to the akindjis (disbanded in 1595) and were composed of volunteer raiders, whose primary source of income, aside from cultivating exempted lands, came from the loot obtained during their raids. These raids could occur during organized campaigns or independently along border lines. A substantial portion of their loot consisted of captives who were sold as slaves. It is estimated that the Crimean Khanate, during the 15th-18th centuries, sold more than 3 million captives as slaves. Their raids in the eastern Slavic regions were devastating. In just one raid in 1688, they brought back 60,000 captives for sale in slave markets.

Skilled horsemen capable of continuous marches for up to 13 hours, the Tatars excelled in constantly harassing the enemy, destroying enemy supply lines. However, they were notoriously undisciplined and often proved unreliable. The flat terrain of Ukraine and Crimea with its vast steppes favored the Tatars’ military tactics of hit-and-run, usually fighting lightly armed with swords and spears. They were also exceptional horse archers.

Their coordinated raids behind the enemy lines could deliver crucial blows to the enemy’s supply lines. For example, the Russian campaign in 1736, which ended with their withdrawal from Ukraine without achieving anything substantial, was a first-class disaster. The constant harassment by the Tatars on supply convoys, coupled with tremendous inadequacy in logistics, resulted in the death of 30,000 men, of whom only 2,000 were on the battlefield. Relying on deception, the Tatars would place human-like figures made of straw on their free horses to appear more numerous while intentionally spreading false and conflicting rumors about their strength and plans. With the scorched-earth tactic, they thwarted large Russian expeditions twice (1687 and 1689), forcing them into retreat.

However, their disobedience and unreliability on the battlefield were proverbial. At Petrovaradin (1716), they withdrew without even engaging in battle when defeat became apparent. During the siege of Ochakov (1737), they deserted massively, leading to the lifting of the siege. In the years 1736-1738, they retreated from the entire war front, leaving the Ottoman garrisons, including Azov, exposed to Russian advances. This caused the displeasure of the Ottoman Sultan, who blamed their incapability, leading to the deposition of their khans, Kaplan, and Fatih Giray. Finally, in the Battle of Kagul in August 1770, despite their enormous numbers, they did not engage on the side of the Ottomans, who suffered a disastrous defeat.

Bibliography

Donald Quataert, “The Ottoman Empire, the Last Centuries 1700-1922,” Cambridge 2005, translated by Marinos Sarygiannis, Alexandria Publications.

V. Aksan, “Ottoman Wars 1700-1870, an Empire besieged,” Harlow 2007, Pearson.

Gabor Agoston, “Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826,” Palgrave, 1999, London.

D. Brian, “The Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire,” London, 2016.

Murat Cinar Buyukakca, “Ottoman Army in the Eighteenth Century: War and Military Reform in the Eastern European Context,” 2007.

R. Murphey, “Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700,” 1998, New Jersey.