Cover photo: Ottoman Janissaries Defending Budin, Under the Command of Suleiman The Magnificent. By the Polish renowned specialist in Oriental themes and history painting Stanislaw Chlebowski.

At the beginning of the 18th century, the number of recorded soldiers in garrisons and units subordinate to central administration amounted to between 133,000 and 196,000. These numbers were noted when the Ottomans decided to mobilize, as their maintenance was impractical, while typically campaigns took place from early May to late October. Apart from the cost of maintaining these numbers, another reason was the fact that the cavalry constituted the majority of the Ottoman army, thus this period was crucial for horse grazing.

An illustrative fact is that by the late 16th century, the cavalry-infantry ratio ranged from 3 to 4 to 1. Personnel were divided into two major bodies, those of the salaried “Slaves of the Porte” (Kapıkulu), namely the Janissaries, the armorers (cebeci), the miners (langıçoç), the gunners (topçus), the transporters of weaponry and materials (top arabacıları), and the 6 regiments of cavalry, while the second comprised provincial mercenaries and holders of timars.

The elite infantry consisted of the Janissary corps (yeni çeri, meaning “new army”). They embodied the concept of loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty, although they often deposed sultans, such as the forced abdication of Bayezid II and the assassination of Osman II, thus constituting a strong force in the empire’s internal politics. There were many attempts to reform the corps in the years 1701, 1709, 1716, 1728, 1739-40, 1768, 1782, 1785, and 1790. However, these attempts failed when they encountered the ulama, the spiritual-religious teachers who held high positions in the bureaucracy, and the immediate subordinates of the sultan, thus maintaining the corrupt system that preserved the Janissary regime and depriving the sultan of creating a reliable personnel for carrying out the necessary reforms. This already explains why it took Mahmud II (1808-1839) eighteen whole years to abolish the Janissaries and change so many powerful agas and viziers.

Their effectiveness on the battlefield served as a permanent deterrent to their opponents who faced them, and although their numbers had increased in the 17th-18th centuries, with the natural consequence of a decline in quality and discipline of the corps, their presence in every campaign became necessary. In 1711, albeit reluctantly, they executed numerous aggressive attacks against the Russians in Pruth, which resulted in 7,000 total losses. At the Battle of Petrovaradin (August 7, 1716) during the Ottoman-Austrian War, the Janissaries stood out from the defeat of the Ottoman army, as they overturned the opposing forces in the initial stages of the battle, forcing them to seek safety behind fortifications.

In 1731, they easily defeated the Safavid infantry, one of the most significant royal dynasties of Persia, to subsequently put to flight the enemy cavalry, while in 1733, against the same foe, they fiercely defended against hostile infantry and cavalry and won the Battle of Samara. The Russian general Rumyantsev achieved a significant victory against the Ottomans at Kartal, near the Kangu River, on August 1, 1770. However, he was impressed by the fortification abilities of the Janissaries and their courage displayed in the last ring of fortifications. In his report to Tsarina Catherine II, he described the tremendous resistance of the Janissaries who resisted for 5 hours despite continuous heavy artillery fire.

The increasing numbers constituted a significant “burden” on the empire’s finances for their maintenance. A characteristic example is the increase in their numbers from 12,798 in 1567-68 to 54,222 in 1680, while the number soared to 78,798 in 1694-95, with the following two decades ranging from 36 to 52 thousand. The decrease to 24,000 during the period 1724-1729 follow by an explosion to 98,726 in 1730.

The unexpected success in the Peloponnesian campaign in 1715 and the subsequent decision of the Porte to reward the Janissaries entangled the issue of maintaining the composition of the corps. The certification of the Janissaries’ compensation (esami) was allowed to be bought and sold, essentially becoming a state bond in the hands of people who had no connection with the corps. At some point, due to forgery, 400,000 certificates were in circulation, while the number of Janissaries in service was 40,000, a fact that excessively burdened the state treasury. In 1775, the total number of the corps remained at 61,000 despite the preceding catastrophic war.

In the decline of their martial value, the introduction of the use of rifles and pistols in European armies contributed, in contrast to the stagnation in this area of the janissaries. Their camps were in Constantinople, although from the 17th century they began to form families, to gain favor for their male offspring for enrollment in the corps, creating a hereditary tradition (koul-oglou) instead of the devshirme, which tended to decline, to settle in cities, to engage in various professions, and to join guilds while also performing guard duties.

The introduction of volley firing was established from the late 16th century, usually after the first volley, with flintlock firing pins, conducting raids for battle with melee weapons (axe, scimitar, club, head crushers, etc.). The 36 to 60 thousand janissaries in the early 18th century did not all constitute the combatant units. The recently recruited (chentid) were clearly the combatants, while there were the veterans (moutekayin) and those who performed guard duties in large cities (koroutsou). Only about 30% of the corps participated in campaigns in the late 18th century.

Sources:

V. Aksan , «Ottoman Wars 1700-1870, an Empire besieged», Harlow 2007, Pearson.

G. Agoston, «Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826», Palgrave, 1999, London.

D. Brian, «The Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire», London,2016.

R. Murphey, «Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700», 1998, New Jersey.

G.Agoston,«The Ottoman Wars and the Changing Balance of Power along the Dunabe», 2011.

G.Agoston,«Behind the Turkish War Machine: Gunpowder Technology and War Industry in the Ottoman Empire, 1450–1700»,The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment, 2005,Cambridge.

G.Agoston, «Ottoman military organization up to 1800», The Encyclopedia of War, 2011.

G.Agoston, «Empires and warfare in east-central Europe , 1550-1775 :the Ottoman Habsburg rivalry and military transformation», 2010.