Cover photo: Mujahideen in Kunar, Afghanistan, 1987.

Text by Konstantinos Bagiotas.

The failure of the Soviet war machine is often compared to the strategic failure of the Americans in Vietnam. However, despite the apparent perception of defeat of a superpower by an inferior force, there are clear differences. The number of Soviet troops never increased dramatically, whereas the Americans started with 20,000 and eventually reached over 500,000. Furthermore, the USSR did not act decisively against neighboring countries that harbored the Mujahideen. In contrast, the Americans decisively struck Laos and Cambodia.

At the helm of the Soviet machine was General Sokolov. The 40th Soviet Army was subordinate to the administration of Turkestan, under Yuri Maksimov. In a more advanced position was Mikhailov in Tap Tapa-Tajbeg, in the capital. Approximately 85,000 men were mobilized within Afghanistan, with another 30,000 north of the Amu River. As shown on the map, the Soviets deployed three mechanized divisions as well as an airborne one. Specifically in the capital Kabul, there were the 108th Mechanized Division and the 103rd Airborne Division, accompanied by the majority of engineers and artillery. About 50 kilometers north, a strong force was concentrated at the Bagram base. Apart from the air force personnel, there were two independent regiments (the 181st Mechanized Regiment and the airborne 345th Regiment).

Additionally, the 201st Mechanized Regiment was stationed in the city of Kunduz near the USSR. The fourth regiment was located in the western part of the country, specifically in the city of Shindand.

At the brigade level, there were two regiments in the cities of Kandahar (70th) and Jalalabad (66th), while the 56th Airborne Regiment was in the city of Gardez. Furthermore, there were some independent regimental units in the locations of Mazar-I-Sarif and Ghazni.

Finally, the inadequately trained 346th and 54th regiments were stationed in the cities of Kushka and Termez, respectively. The arrangement of Soviet forces reflects their emphasis on the northern and eastern parts of the country. Moreover, in the central part of the country lay the inhospitable mountains of the Hazarajat range. The main focus was on the Kabul-Bagram axis to protect the vital Salang highway. Emphasis was placed on the eastern borders in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar, with ANSF to interrupt leaks to and from the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Quetta, respectively. The former had evolved into a stronghold for the Mujahideen, as the Pashtuns constituted the main population group there. In the western part of the country, there was a regiment to defend the second most important airbase, Shindand.

Economically, northern Afghanistan was significant for the USSR. In the 1960s, natural gas sources were discovered in Shibarghan, Jozjan province. A 15-kilometer pipeline was laid to import it into the USSR, while oil was found in Sar-I-Pul and Ali Gul. Politically, the region was mainly inhabited by major ethnic minorities of the country (Tajiks, Uzbeks), as was the case north of the borders, within the USSR.

Another rationale for the Soviet Union’s interest in the northern territories stemmed from their proximity to the Soviet border with Central Asia, where Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen populations resided on both sides. Despite facing religious pressures, these communities shared common traits and identified with Islam as their shared religion.

Primarily, Soviet military bases were concentrated in strategic urban centers and transportation hubs, indicating a preference for defensive positions rather than dispersing across rural expanses. Secondly, significant importance was placed on Kabul, Bagram, and their environs. Thirdly, the provinces situated in the northern Hindu Kush held strategic significance due to the Salang Pass serving as a crucial transportation route, economic value stemming from gas, oil, and mineral reserves, and political importance derived from shared characteristics among residents on either side of the border. Fourthly, the western and southwestern regions were deemed precarious, barring the Shindand Airfield’s dominance over the Persian Gulf. The remaining areas of western Afghanistan were designated as a buffer zone with Iran, with the road extending to Kushk from Herat being safeguarded and managed by the faction.

The forces deployed to Afghanistan were poorly trained and unprepared for guerrilla warfare, with their weapons and equipment mostly leftovers from World War II. This kind of mobilization was different from their occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as at that time their forces consisted of twenty combined arms divisions of 250,000 soldiers. Obviously, their primary goal was merely to protect the pro-Karmal government and boost the morale of the Afghan armed forces to defend against insurgent attacks. However, this prediction and calculation were not accurate, and they were forced to deploy more forces.

Bibliography

Ali Ahmad Jalali, “The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War”, publ. Military Bookshop, 2010.

L. Grau and M. Gress, “The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost”, publ. University Press of Kansas, 2002.

S. Tanner, “Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban”, Da Capo Press, 2009.