The invasion of the Russian army into the Chechen capital during the First Chechen War (December 1994 – February 1995)

Cover photo by Christopher Morris

Text by Tasos Malesiadas

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia became the successor state to the once mighty “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (USSR), taking over the governance of the territories that comprised it. Finding itself vulnerable and weak in the face of the secession of states and territories, as well as the loss of a significant part of the armed forces that had previously constituted the ‘Red Army’ and formed the core of the national armies of the new entities.

Chechnya was a crucial point for the transfer of Russian oil. Its relations with Russia were historically tense, and at that time, the autonomous faction of its politics saw the opportunity for self-determination. However, the legal framework did not allow for its complete secession, as was permitted in the Baltic countries and other former Soviet entities.

Russia, however, was not going to allow Chechnya to secede because it would create a ‘living example’ for other ethnicities in the region to claim their independence. This abrupt strategic shift in balances in the Caucasus would be detrimental to Russia’s already wounded influence in the region, at a time when it certainly did not want to abandon all the territories that remained after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The Intervention in Chechnya: After intense and bloody conflicts, continuous coups and countercoups, the Russian Federation decided to take action. Of course, this did not mean it had been indifferent to the developments all this time, as it supported the opposition with equipment and mercenaries to continue its struggle. The military forces had already blockaded the province of Chechnya, but due to parallel operations in Ossetia, they did not yet have the strength for their aggressive move.

In late November 1994, Boris Yeltsin issued a telegram to Dudayev, instructing him to disarm immediately and surrender all his forces (Chechnya was under complete military mobilization). This would have meant the free passage of the forces of the Russian Federation into the region and the restoration of political control before the events. The government from Grozny refused. At the same time as the negative response, Yeltsin gave the order for the army to intervene to ‘restore constitutional order’ by force.

The very next day, the Russian air force bombed the capital of Chechnya. For the next five days, the military blockade on the borders of the province with the rest of the territory became more and more airtight, as more and more units gathered, which would constitute the invasion forces. The Russian headquarters were filled with a spirit of overconfidence, as the comparison of forces and material superiority was clearly in their favor. The Chechens mostly had militia units, with their militarily trained men reaching only 15% of the total force. Moreover, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General Pavel Grachev, stated unequivocally: ‘We will manage to overthrow Dudayev in a few hours, using only a regiment of paratroopers. It will be a bloodless ‘lightning war,’ and it will not last beyond December 20.’

On December 6, five days after the start of the air bombardments, Dudayev entered into negotiations with Grachev for the start of negotiations and the cessation of further violence. Empty words that fell on deaf ears, as on December 11, 1994, the ground forces of the Russians invaded Chechnya.

The Operations: Towards Grozny, the Russian army invading Chechnya followed the course of three invasion axes to disperse the forces of the autonomists so that they could not achieve a strategic concentration capable of hindering the invasion. The objective of the operation was, of course, to occupy the capital, Grozny, to overthrow Dudayev’s rule and to regain control for Russia. Simultaneously, in the plains and mountains of the province, the Russian army aimed to eliminate various autonomy-seeking groups to prevent the possibility of further operations.”

The regular army and units of the “Internal Troops” easily overturned the positions of the separatists. Their three phalanxes, which had started from Dagestan in the east, North Ossetia in the west, and northwest, essentially encircled Grozny, pushing the opposing units towards the interior of the province. What was initially perceived as the expected and proud victory of the Russian army was, in essence, its failure – the inability to destroy the main body of the separatists on the plains, allowing them to fortify themselves within the capital.

However, in the Russian camp, especially in the higher echelons of the hierarchy, this involvement was not particularly welcome. Deputy Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, General Eduard Varambiof, ordered the intervention to stop because “it is a crime to send troops against our own people.” His opinion, along with that of many officers and government officials, fell on deaf ears. Many professional military personnel refused the order to be transferred to units participating in the invasion.

Some faced military court, and others immediately left the armed forces. Varambiof resigned. Also, the advisor on National Affairs to Yeltsin, as well as the Deputy Minister of Defense, General Boris Gromov, resigned. The latter even prophesied: “It will be bloody, another Afghanistan.” Approaching the city, the Russian army faced not only the resistance of the Chechens but also its own situation, which resembled a disorderly body rather than the strong army everyone believed.

Intense airstrikes against military targets, as well as non-military points, and the deadly artillery barrages of the advancing army spread death within the besieged city. The buildings had taken on a gray and black color, and, naturally, there was no distinction between Chechens and other city residents. The indiscriminate firepower of Russian weapons hit every part of the city. The roads leading to Grozny, passing through conflict zones, were filled with civilian populations trying to escape from the increasingly transforming city into ruins. The once economic, cultural, and administrative center of the northern Caucasus bore no resemblance to its former self.

Dudayev’s men, while the “Russian steamroller” approached Grozny from every direction, pledged not to abandon their struggle. They changed their strategy from positional warfare to guerrilla warfare, defending their city against the overwhelming superiority of the Russian army.

The situation of the Russian army: General Pavel Grachev’s words that the operation would last until December 20 had not been verified. Surely, it did not require just one parachute regiment to defeat the separatists. It needed much more than the at least 35,000 men at that time (38,500 in December 1994) in units whose composition was not suitable for long-term operations. Many units fought with only 40% of their designated strength. The Russian army, due to the speed of political developments, had not had time to deploy units equipped and staffed for the requirements of the operations. In many cases, according to declassified archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense and testimonies of men who served from the initial phase of the invasion, many motorized units suffered vehicle losses of around 60%, with the overwhelming majority due to technical problems that rendered the vehicles non-operational.

The leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense decided to take outdated vehicles and tanks from the warehouses because it believed that their mere appearance could be enough to defeat the separatists. After all, during the Soviet era, the material stored for the event of a general conflict was virtually unlimited. At that time, the Military Region of the North Caucasus (to which the invasion forces belonged) exclusively received material stored since the 1970s.

There was also an issue with the staffing of invasion units. The Russian command decided to send conscripts to the expeditionary units – men who, under normal conditions and compared to other armies, would not have completed their basic military training. Also, there were difficulties in the crews of the battle tanks because heterogeneous and untrained crews were formed, further burdening the already tense situation. Most of the forces called upon to complete an operation for the “restoration of order and constitutional normality” against an opponent with a psychological bond and a sense of mission had not been trained for their mission, in their vehicles, and even in their personal armament.

Of course, there were exceptions. The men of the Special Forces of the Russian army, as well as some motorized infantry units, were combat-ready. Still, even they could not bear the colossal burden of the operations alone.

The battle in the city

As the invasion continued, the three initial axes of attack had approached the outskirts of Grozny, encircling it. Inside the city, bombardments, comparable to those of World War II, had destroyed most of it. The first major assault on the city occurred on New Year’s Eve of 1995. At 5 in the morning, the city was shaken by an even greater onslaught of aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and battle tanks positioned around the capital. Even the individual weapons of infantry units, such as mortars, machine guns, grenade launchers, and heavy machine guns, were fired at the targets. Every wall was riddled with holes, and if any roof had managed to remain untouched by bombardments, it collapsed.

The hits on the oil tanks in the west of the city created dense black smoke hovering over the battlefield. Ash blew everywhere in the air. Some aircraft, just before the ground assault, dropped leaflets on the Chechens, urging them to surrender. Grachev himself, retracting his initial statements at the start of the operations, stated, “It is undeniable that a storming will take place in the classical sense of the term. What does a storming in a city mean? It means the full use and utilization of all available forces, weapons, and means of a state’s arsenal. Mainly, it means preparatory artillery fire with missiles that will last for several hours. It means raids and bombardments across the entire city to render 60% of the defenders out of battle and undermine the morale of the rest.”

Notes:

1. National Guard units directly subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
2. The units involved in the invasion were a mix of volunteers, conscripts, and often poorly trained men who, in many cases, came from different units and lacked the necessary spirit of cooperation. As mentioned earlier, the equipment proved unreliable for urban combat, playing a decisive role in the subsequent change of the Russian command’s strategy.
3. “Tyfekiofori” Regiments are Infantry Regiments according to their Russian military designation.
4. With an internet search, one can easily find the events of the destruction of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, the chilling calls of the surrounded men, and understand the tactical situation of the battle and the chaos.
   
   Sources:
   
   “Chechnya: Calamity In The Caucasus”, by Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, New York University Press, 1998.
   
   N. N. Novichkov, V. Ya. Snegovskiy, A. G. Sokolov, and V. Yu. Shvarev, “Russian Armed Forces In Chechen Conflict”.
   
   “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” Timothy L. Thomas, Parameters, Summer 1999
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