A Glimpse into the Past

A Glimpse into the Past

Category: Post WW2
Dying in Grozny, 1994-1995 (Part B')
Dying in Grozny, 1994-1995 (Part B')
Category: Post WW2
Dying in Grozny, 1994-1995 (Part B')
Dying in Grozny, 1994-1995 (Part B')

The invasion of the Russian army into the Chechen capital during the First Chechen War (December 1994 – February 1995)

Certainly, his statement contradicted his initial intentions and plans. As developments unfolded, they proved the annulment of all the plans of his headquarters. The assault on the city would be carried out from three directions, with equal “Battle Groups” named after the direction from which their attack would start.

The “Battle Group North,” with a Line of Advance in the hills near the airport in the northern suburbs of the city, aimed to reach the Presidential Palace. The forces of the Battle Group consisted of:

  • The 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment “Guards” with Riflemen.
  • The 3rd Brigade of the 6th Armored Guards Regiment.
  • Elements (2 Regiments) of the 131st Motorized Rifle Division “Maikop.”
  • The 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment.

The “Battle Group West,” with a Line of Advance in the western suburbs of the city, aimed to capture the M-29 highway, Lenin Park, and the Central Railway Station of the city. Its forces consisted of:

  • The 639th Motorized Rifle Regiment.
  • The 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment.
  • The 237th Paratrooper Regiment.
Grozny, 1995, photo by Christopher Morris

The “Northwest Battle Group,” with a Line of Advance in the northwest suburbs of the city through the Petrovskaya Avenue, aimed at the Grozny Central Hospital complex. It consisted of:

  • The 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment “Guards.”
  • The 74th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade.
  • The 33rd Motorized Rifle Brigade.

The “Battle Group East,” with Lines of Advance on Gudermesky and Khankalsky streets, aimed at the Grozny Airport and providing cover for the intersections of R-305/R-306 highways in their operation area. It consisted of:

  • The 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment “Guards.”
  • The 133rd Independent Tank Brigade.
  • The 98th Paratrooper Regiment “Guards.”

Fighting against “walls and ghosts”: The phalanxes entered the city, and their advance began overturning isolated Chechen fighters and advancing through the streets and avenues that each sector had designated as the Line of Advance. The forward units of the forces were more concerned with sniper fire and the collection and destruction of explosive charges and mines placed by the separatists, disrupting the main roads.

The Russian phalanxes had to cooperate to overcome any resistance and converge their forces on the Presidential Palace, suppressing the Chechen insurgency. However, the lack of communication between the officers and leaders participating in the operation made each phalanx essentially autonomous, with an initiative that ultimately condemned their aggressive momentum and deprived them of the synchronization necessary to prevent their assault from faltering.

Some Russian phalanxes did not move at all, as ordered by the attack, others moved minimally, one regiment was repelled, while only one phalanx managed to advance towards the interior.

A Chechen stands in the street during the battle for Grozny, January 1995. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev. During the First Chechen War, Chechen separatist forces included a large number of boys and girls, some as young as 11. According to the UN: “Child soldiers in Chechnya were reportedly assigned the same tasks as adult combatants, and served on the front lines soon after joining the armed forces.”

As the advance continued, this irregular movement of Russian aggressive units was soon noticed by the Chechens, who concentrated their forces against the more advanced and therefore vulnerable forces, which were none other than the main invading force, the “Battle Group North” advancing with the Objective to the Presidential Palace. There they gathered their most substantial forces. This specific invading force was decimated.

Trapped amid the thousands of debris, it made the movement of their vehicles impossible and left the Infantry exposed to the fire of the Chechens. As the Russian soldiers themselves say, it was impossible to overcome them because they were fighting against “walls and ghosts” on a battlefield reminiscent of Stalingrad, the great and deadly battle of World War II, under the same exact conditions as then.

Continuation of the Battle and Occupation of the City

The continuous orders from the Russian leadership to advance, beyond the damage they caused to themselves, clearly resulted in enormous losses for their opponent. These losses might be considered even greater, as the Chechen separatists didn’t have the reserves of the Russian army.

Attempting counterattacks in open terrain, the Chechens lacked the numbers and equipment to deliver decisive blows against the invading forces. Russian artillery and air forces demonstrated their superiority, destroying any attempt to resist.

Using their last reserves, the Chechens organized convoys to withdraw coordinately from the city, leaving behind a formidable defense. However, these convoys were almost completely destroyed by the Russian Air Force in the following days, and both sides received reinforcements. The Chechens were reinforced by Mujahideen from Afghanistan, while Russian units of Chechen volunteers and Naval Infantry also joined.

In the second phase of the invasion, the Russian army seemed to have learned from past mistakes. Special forces opened corridors near the lines of motorized forces, snipers monitored the movements of the separatists, and artillery observers provided precise positions of enemy forces. No unit acted without prior coordination with the command and nearby units. Grad missiles destroyed any possible assembly areas, demolishing large complexes that had served as strongholds for the separatists in the previous invasion, reminiscent of the Battle of Stalingrad.

On January 7, the Russian Christmas, mechanized units converged towards the Presidential Palace, sweeping away any resistance. Reconnaissance units, supported by armored vehicles, overturned any positions that had hindered their advance in the previous days.

By January 9, a ceasefire was declared. However, it was nothing more than a ruse by the Russians to identify enemy positions in the fluid environment of the city, reorganize their forces, and advance further. Battle tanks fired directly at the Palace, and the infantry took an aggressive position next to them.

For the following weeks, significant battles unfolded outside the Presidential Palace, which was besieged in a medieval manner but with modern weapons. The defenders, now low on ammunition, food, and supplies, couldn’t hold the building as long as they wished. Artillery continuously bombarded their positions, and aircraft dropped bombs specially designed for fortress destruction. The top of the Palace collapsed in flames, and some floors were destroyed, killing several defenders. The losses of the Chechens skyrocketed, and in three groups, the separatists abandoned the building towards the southern outskirts of the city to continue their struggle. The Presidential Palace had been captured.

A Chechen fighter during the Battle of Grozny, January 1995
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev.

Russian Victory?

On the military front, in the days that followed, the Russians had ceased bombings and were gathering the dead. Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, in an atmosphere of relief, announced, “The military phase of the operation to restore order is over.”

Russian General Rokhlin refused the highest honor of Hero of the Russian Federation, stating that there was “nothing glorious or heroic fighting a war within my own country.”

By the end of January 1995, Dudayev declared that Russian prisoners would not be returned unless a ceasefire was signed. A temporary truce was granted, and various enclaves or agreements were reached, such as the one in mid-February that “prohibited” the use of heavy weaponry until the end of the same month, restricting the forces of warlord Shamil Basayev to skirmishes against Russian forces.

Losses

Official Russian losses reported 1,376 dead and 408 missing during the operations. Russian sources also mention nearly 5,000 wounded and 96 prisoners. Material losses include 62 battle tanks destroyed and 163 armored fighting vehicles or personnel carriers. These figures are blatantly small and not representative of the true situation, as entire units were annihilated during the invasion on New Year’s Eve. The Chechen side reports that 4,000 Russians were killed on that day alone, but this is not considered reliable.

However, the true tragedy lies in civilian casualties. Counts at that time showed 35,000 dead civilians, including 5,000 children. Mass, indiscriminate bombings and blind bombardments in populated areas were the main reasons for these high numbers. The use of bombs and phosphorus munitions against the separatists often resulted in the victimization of families that had chosen to stay in the war zone.

Notes

  1. National Guard units directly subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
  2. The units involved in the invasion were a mix of volunteers, conscripts, and often poorly trained men who, in many cases, came from different units and lacked the necessary spirit of cooperation. As mentioned earlier, the equipment proved unreliable for urban combat, playing a decisive role in the subsequent change of the Russian command’s strategy.
  3. “Tyfekiofori” Regiments are Infantry Regiments according to their Russian military designation.
  4. With an internet search, one can easily find the events of the destruction of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, the chilling calls of the surrounded men, and understand the tactical situation of the battle and the chaos.

    Sources:

    “Chechnya: Calamity In The Caucasus”, by Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, New York University Press, 1998.

    N. N. Novichkov, V. Ya. Snegovskiy, A. G. Sokolov, and V. Yu. Shvarev, “Russian Armed Forces In Chechen Conflict”.

    “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” Timothy L. Thomas, Parameters, Summer 1999
    Wayback Machine’s Archives.