Cover photo: “Bulgarians overrun the Ottoman positions à la bayonette”, by the Czech painter Jaroslav Věšín, 1912, collection of the Bulgarian National Museum of Military History.

Many times in history, mention is made of the influence of Great Powers on smaller states regarding both external and internal politics, resulting in the adoption of a fatalistic attitude toward an “inevitable outcome” in which the stance of a smaller state plays no role. However, one of these examples is not the First Balkan War.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed profound shifts in global politics, economics, and military dynamics, significantly altering the balance of power and introducing new paradigms. These changes had far-reaching effects on the Balkan Peninsula, where countries experienced dramatic transformations. The period saw renewed attention to the Eastern Question, concerning the division of territories within the weakening Ottoman Empire.

Despite the interests of the Great Powers at the time, which dictated to a greater or lesser extent the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, they could not restrain the Balkan countries. The Italians’ decisive military victories over the Ottoman Empire ( 29 September 1911 – 18 October 1912) and the successful Albanian revolt (January–August 1912) encouraged the Balkan states to imagine that they might win a war against the Ottomans. By the spring and summer of 1912, the various Christian Balkan nations had created a network of military alliances, becoming known as the Balkan League.

At that time, Austria-Hungary had clearly competitive interests with the South Slavic states, leaning towards the Ottoman Empire with the active Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, while Germany did not appear as a protector of the Ottoman Empire, France was a significant capital investor both in the Balkan Peninsula and in Asian Turkey and opposed a war crisis, and England tended to embrace the old doctrine of Ottoman integrity, especially after the victory of the Young Turks.

The French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré himself visited St. Petersburg in August 1912 anxiously and was active in every direction to prevent the impending war crisis. Russia, on the other hand, opposed taking aggressive action since it had not secured desirable coverage from another Great Power. In a last attempt to avert it, the European governments, after concerted efforts by Poincaré, unanimously condemned on October 5, 1912, any action that would undermine peace, warning that they would not accept (!) any change in territorial status quo, invoking Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.

All in vain. The Balkan countries wrote off any indication or threat from the Great Powers, and after 3 days Montenegro and 8 days Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria invaded the Ottoman Empire. Within just a month and a half, the combined Christian forces had caused 250,000 casualties among the Ottomans and had reached (the Bulgarians) Çatalca, 45 km from Constantinople, had captured Monastir (Serbs), the Aegean, and Thessaloniki (Greeks), with the remaining centers of resistance being Adrianople, Bitola, and Scutari.

Bibliography

K. Svolopoulos, “Greek Foreign Policy 1900-1945“, publ. Estia, 1997, Athens.

R. Hall, “Richard C. (2000). “The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War”, publ. Rutledge, London, 2000.

J. Schurman,“The Balkan Wars 1912 to 1913”, publ. Kessinger, 2004.