Cover photo: The Acropolis imagined in an 1846 painting by the German architect and painter Leo von Klenze. The desire of Athens for full sovereignty over Greek affairs was often manifested several times in a particularly aggressive manner towards its allies who wanted to secede and become independent. The brutality of the Athenians described in the dialogue indicates that the sovereignty of Athens was unquestionable.

The Athenians, in March of 416 BC, during the lull of the Peloponnesian War brought about by the signing of the Peace of Nicias, appeared in Melos (or Milos) with the aim of persuading the Melians to join their alliance. The Athenians campaigned Melos with 3,000 men (1520 Athenians and about 1500 of allies) and a fleet of 30 Athenian and 8 allied ships from Chios and Lesvos and threatened to completely destroy them if they refused to ally with them.The motive behind this overt invasion is not yet clear. Perhaps the leaders of the Athenian assembly wanted to wash away the shame of the city’s failure to regain Amphipolis and the cities of Chalkidiki, which had defected during the early phase of the 27-year war.

Nevertheless, at some point during the negotiations, when the Melians-who were colonists of the Spartans- insisted on invoking the principles of international law and ethics, the Athenians responded: “Our demand is to achieve what we consider feasible from what we truly have in mind, knowing well that both you and we understand that, according to human judgment, justice is taken into account only when both opposing parties have equal power to enforce it, and that when this is not the case, the powerful enforce whatever their strength allows them…”.

The following are some of the most significant excerpts from the dialogue (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.84.1-5.116.4)

”-Athenians: Well, we won’t use grand words or lengthy phrases to demonstrate that our victory over the Medes granted us the right to exert our hegemony, nor that we are campaigning against you now because you wronged us. Such arguments wouldn’t sway you. However, we also ask you not to attempt to persuade us by saying that, although colonists of the Spartans, you are not their allies, or that you never harmed us. Let’s discuss, though, what can be achieved considering each other’s true intentions and understanding that, in human relations, legal arguments hold value when those invoking them are roughly equal in power, and conversely, the strong imposes what their power allows, while the weak retreats as much as their weakness compels..(..) What we want to convey to you now is that we have come here for the benefit of our hegemony, and that what we will present to you aims at the salvation of your city-state. We aim to subjugate you without causing ourselves unnecessary trouble and without destroying you, which is in our mutual interest

-Melians: So you wouldn’t accept being our friends instead of our enemies, to live peacefully and remain neutral?

-Athenians: Your enmity does not harm us as much as your friendship would be interpreted as a sign of our weakness, while your hatred is, for those we rule over, evidence of our strength. (..) As for their rights, none of our allies believes they are lacking, but they believe that those who maintain their autonomy owe it to their own strength, and that our fear restrains us from campaigning against them.

-Melians: We know, however, that sometimes the fortunes of war create more balance between opponents than one would expect from the difference in their strengths. If we yield immediately, we will lose all hope immediately, whereas as long as we resist, we will still have some hope.

-Athenians: In times of danger, hope is a consolation, and those who rely on it—when they also have surplus strength—may be harmed by it, but it does not destroy them. However, whoever trusts in it to go all in—the nature of hope is always such that it leads astray—then only understands its true essence when it has been destroyed and has no way to protect themselves from it once they have experienced it.

-Melians: But we believe that the gods will not deprive us of luck, for we are just and face the unjust. As for the inadequacy of our strength, our allies, the Spartans, will assist us because they are forced to do so, if not for any other reason, then because we are kin and out of a sense of honor. (p.s. Spartans didn’t came to assist Melians..)

-Athenians: But we also believe that the favor of the gods will not abandon us, for neither our claims nor our actions deviate from the religious beliefs of people or from the principles they apply to their relationships with one another.(..) From what one can surmise about the gods and from what is certain about humans, we believe that both gods and humans always adhere to an absolute law of nature, to always enforce their power if they have the strength to do so. We neither established nor applied this law first. We found it to be in effect, and we follow it, just as those who succeed us will follow it eternally. We know well that you, or anyone else, would do the same if you had our power. As for your expectation that the Spartans, out of a sense of honor, will come to your aid, we commend your simplicity, but we do not envy your foolishness

(..)

After this lesson in political realism, the Athenians withdrew from the conference warning the Melians that “When we have withdrawn, think again carefully, and do not forget that you will decide the fate of your homeland, that you have no other, and that its salvation or destruction will depend on this decision of yours” and awaited the response. The latter calculated that it would be preferable for the Athenians to accept them as friends rather than enemies and that they would have time to secure the alliance of the Spartans.

They were wrong. Unfortunately for them, neither did the Spartans risk involving themselves with the powerful Athens nor did the Athenians judge it beneficial anymore to have them as friends. Despite laying out all their arguments, they had understood only a few..

The Athenians responded with these few words, withdrawing definitively from the assembly, saying: “From your decision, it seems to us that you are the only people who judge more based on future events than the situation before you. You believe that merely because you desire it, future and indefinite things have already occurred. You have placed all your trust in the Spartans, in fortune, and in your hopes, and you will lose everything.”

The representatives of the Athenians returned to the camp, and the generals, since the Melians had not yielded on anything, immediately began their operations. They constructed a circular wall around the city, assigning the work to units from various cities, and then left a garrison, both Athenian and allied, both by land and by sea, and withdrew most of the army. The remaining garrison continued the siege. In the following months, the Melians managed to seize portions of the Athenian fortifications twice, without, however, breaking the siege. After that, another army from Athens, led by Philocrates son of Demus, arrived during the winter of 416-415 BC , and the siege tightened. There was also some betrayal, and the Melians were forced to surrender to the discretion of the Athenians.

After the fall of the island, the Athenians executed all adult men and sold the Melian women and children as slaves in the slave markets of Piraeus. The Athenians then transferred approximately 500 of their own settlers to the island. The Athenians committed one of the greatest crimes in human history, a reprehensible act even for that era. Their arrogance, however, punished them a few years later, with the great disaster in Syracuse.

The Spartans never rushed to help. And though they were the ones who inspired the reaction of the Melians, they provided a timeless example of raw realpolitik..

With the final defeat of Athens in 405 BC, the Spartan general Lysander expelled the Athenian settlers from Melos and resettled the descendants of the old inhabitants there.

Source:

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War