Cover photo: Attila the Hun, by the exceptional History AI Art.

Text by Ilias Anagnostakis

After failing in front of the formidable walls of Orleans and learning that Aetius was only 20 kilometers away, Attila decided to evacuate Gaul and retreat towards the Rhine. It was evident that his incredibly large army had depleted all the region’s resources, and it was clear that if he remained in Gaul for a few more days, he would face a serious food shortage. However, Aetius and his ally, Visigothic King Theodoric, had moved much faster, and with their main infantry, they sought to force him to fight with his back to a river, preventing him from employing the deadly nomadic tactics of feigned retreat, something both the Roman general Aetius and the Visigothic leader Theodoric knew firsthand. And so it happened.

Around 4:00 in the morning on June 19, 451, the scouts of the Huns saw the masses of Romans and their allies cutting off their path to Germanic territories, on the vast plains of the Catalaunian Fields, near the city of Troyes, approximately 7.5 kilometers west of the city, with the Seine behind them. As a true nomadic warlord and leader of a huge coalition of Huns and subordinate barbarians, Attila decided to fight, something both Aetius and the Visigoths desperately sought, having been exhausted by the relentless pursuit by the Huns for 80 (!) years.

Much has been said about the size of the involved armies, ranging from astronomical figures to absurdities like “50,000 men!” by indeed eminent serious historians, focusing on the problem of logistical support, blatantly ignoring the fact that Attila controlled in various ways a vast area from Ukraine to the Rhine and from Northern Germany to Belgrade, something impossible with 30,000 men, while the bolstered Western Roman Empire still had many forces, with all the barbarian populations settled in its territories mobilized against them, as it was evident that the Huns posed a terrifying threat to everyone.

Furthermore, all sources report terrifying numbers, which however incredible, should make us suspicious that the size of the opposing armies was simply enormous, because only this could impress the contemporaries of the time, who were accustomed to armies of the order of 50,000-70,000 men.

Jordanes states that Attila’s barbarian coalition amounted to 500,000 men [1]while both sides lost about 165,000 men in total [2] emphasise on the size of the opposing armies and the bloody outcome is frequently observed : «..a terrible war, manifold and extremely persistent, the like of which there is no telling in antiquity, where such events are related, that there was nothing that a great man could have seen in his life, who was deprived of the sight of this miracle..»[3].

Similarly, albeit much briefer, a description which nevertheless does not lack emphasis on the criticality of the conflict and the colossal sizes of the adversaries, Paul the Deacon reports that «..the strongest nations meet from here and there, the battle lines are drawn up, and a war becomes extremely bitter and persistent, the kind of which no history tells..» [4], while previously, after enumerating the numerous allies of Attila, he makes mention of «..almost the whole people of the West, all of whom Aetius had..» [5].

The final tally of losses that he presents amounts to a total of 180,000 dead with a few common lyrical exaggerations, yet accurately reflecting the exceptionally bloody nature of this battle. Hydatius, in turn, mentions the -truly excessive- number of 300,000 dead in a brief reference to the events that unfolded.[6] Ultimately, the Paschal Chronicle explicitly states that Attila commanded “myriads of men.” [7]

As we have seen in the cited sources, they all converge on the immense scale of the battle, the extraordinarily large diversity of tribes involved on each side, as well as its critical nature. The allied tribes with the Romans fully grasped this, and despite their disputes with them, they aligned themselves completely to face the threat, which, moreover, constituted the main reason for the permanent migration from the Eurasian steppes.

Nor should we overlook the fact that similar massive migrations of tribes, which caused immense destruction in the Roman Empire, as well as in the Balkans and the Greek region, such as the Gallic invasion of 281 BCE with tens of thousands of warriors – exceeding 100,000 – the numbers of which have not been “critically addressed” by contemporary historians. Examples in Roman history can be found in the protracted and colossal clashes with the Germanic and Celtic tribes of the Cimbri, Teutons, Ambrones and Tigurini at 113–101 BC when Rome itself had been seriously threatened, the numerous Dacians in the conflicts during the early 2nd century AD, with Germanic tribes Marcomanni, Quadi, and the Sarmatian Iazyges at 166-180 A.D.

It is worth noting that Jordanes does not consistently provide the same large numbers. During the invasion of the Goths and Carpi in 249 AD in the regions of Dacia, Moesia, and Thrace, he states that there were 70,000 men, while during the devastating incursion of 267-268 AD, in which a clearly larger number participated from various tribes such as the Peucini, Greuthungi, Ostrogoths, Tervingi, Visigoths, Gepids, Celts, and Heruli, he notes a dynamic figure of 320,000.

Even though these references may involve an element of exaggeration, his intention to distinguish events and provide the information available to him is evident. Also noteworthy is the reference to the Battle of Utus, which took place just 4 years before the battle in the Catalaunian Plains. There, the Eastern Roman Empire deployed at least 80 to 90 thousand men (71,232 on paper and local militias on the way, a number accepted by historians Gerard Friell and Stephen Williams) and was defeated by the Huns of Attila who also deployed a vast force.

Jordanes and Sidonius present a detailed list of the conflicting coalitions and nations, which, however much each historian tries to “downplay” them, still ends up facing colossal numbers. It seems, therefore, based on estimates by prominent military historians like Finland’s Ikaa Sulvane, as well as the “educated guess” which the writer is a fervent advocate of, that Attila’s colossal barbarian coalition included :

100,000 “Black” Hunnic cavalry (as the core of the army – anything less than this number would be unable to effectively control and intimidate such a multitude of Barbarian nations).
60,000 Ostrogoths (many of them infantry).
5,000 Rugians (a Germanic tribe from the Pannonian Basin, mainly infantry).
30,000 Gepids (a Germanic tribe from the northern Balkans, mainly cavalry).
10,000 “Red” Hunnic cavalry from the Caucasus region.
20,000 Burgundians (a Germanic tribe from the Baltic, gradually settled in Gaul, mainly infantry).
10,000 Skirians (a Germano-Dacian tribe from Dacia, mainly infantry).
15,000 Nervians (a Celtic-Germanic tribe from central Germany, mainly infantry).
10,000 Bastarnae (a Celtic-Dacian-Thracian tribe from the northern Balkans/Carpathians, mainly infantry).
20,000 Thuringians (a Germanic tribe from Pomerania, which later gave its name to a region in central Germany, mainly infantry).
12,000 Brokteri (a Germanic tribe from the confederation of the Franks of the Upper Rhine, mainly infantry).
10,000 “Ripuarian” Franks, of the Nekar River region, from the area of Belgium, mainly infantry).

Total of Attila’s barbarian coalition with author’s estimates: Approximately 300,000 men, with the Huns making up about 35% of this number, an absolutely logical percentage to effectively control and lead such a large and warlike subject population. Of course, non-combatants (artisans, food suppliers, servants, armorers, women, children) who would be another at least 50,000, would not be calculated, raising the number of the Barbarian mass to unimaginable heights.

Regarding the size of the Roman coalition, it is considered certain that Aetius could rely on the total Roman attacking force in Gaul:

(50,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry – the vast majority Latinized Gauls and descendants of ancient Roman-Italian colonists),

15,000 “Bucellarii” (professional Roman units of bodyguards and full-time soldiers),

50,000 Visigoths under their own king, Theodoric (accompanied by two of his own sons, Thorismund and Theodoric),

30,000 Frankish “Salii” warriors, the other branch of their Ripuarian cousins, fighting for Attila,

10,000 Sarmatians (Iranian people, having crossed the Rhine fleeing from Attila),

10,000 Burgundians (who had already entered Gaul by 415 and would fight against their fellow countrymen who had been left beyond the Rhine, also fighting for the Huns),

15,000 Armoricanians (mainly Alans from the region of Britannia, but also many Celts, all excellent horsemen),

5,000 Britons (Latinized Celts infantry, from the region of Britannia),

8,000 Germans of unspecified origin, likely from Saxony, mainly infantry.

An unknown number of Gallic border troops (Limitanei) were also present, but certainly not fewer than 10,000, as there had been a partial mobilization in 443/4.The total Roman coalition force was approximately 200,000 men, with the Roman troops themselves comprising approximately 38%, a perfectly reasonable proportion consistent with the state of the Western Roman army at the time.

(The evaluation conducted by the author relied upon the fidelity of the analysis of ancient historical sources. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the potential perturbation these figures may cause to the reader, should half of the referenced figures be deemed authentic, they would diverge significantly from the assertions put forth by numerous contemporaneous historians. P.S. The estimate of the HS is somewhere in the middle, that is, the composition of the Hunnic army and their allies at 120,000 men and the Romans together with their allies at 100,000.)

This colossal clash, with both sides covering eight kilometers, began around 20:00 on June 19 of 451, when Aetius sent 30,000 Ripuarian Franks as allies to drive away 30,000 Gepids from the heights, to have a «foothold» for the stormy clash the next day. After incredible bloodshed, where both Germanic adversaries lost 15,000 men each, the victorious Franks cleared all resistance by around 02:00 on June 20th.

An attempt by Attila to retake the heights around 05:00 failed, so with the first light, around 06:00, the two super armies began to line up along eight kilometers and a depth of hundreds of meters, raising a cloud of dust «..to the sky.». The Ostrogoths, 60,000 strong, attacked fiercely against the 50,000 Visigoths, their ex cousins, «..sweeping everything..», as the Eastern Goths always had a significant advantage in cavalry over their Western relatives. The severely pressed Visigoths began to retreat, and their king, Theodoric, fell from his horse and was trampled by his own men.

70,000 Hunnic mounted archers attacked fiercely against a huge square of 50,000 Roman legionaries just to be repelled, while another 40,000 (including many heavily armed Huns) attacked a mass of Alans and Franks, while the raging 15,000 Gepids tried to find an opening through a huge mass of Gallic-Germanic allies of Aetius, with catastrophic results.

On the left, Aetius, with his 15,000 loyal Bucellarii, and a staunch Alan contingent, inflicted «monstrous» losses on the Huns, while the Armoricanians, Britons, and Germanic allies held firm despite the endless waves of 100,000 or more of Attila’s allies, who «..struck them like the waves of the ocean». Around 20:00, after 16(!) hours of continuous fighting, the bodies of the dead had piled up to three-meter mounds, «for many kilometers», while Attila now realized that the battle was leading nowhere, so he ordered the withdrawal of his countless men in the night, vacating his immense camp (which had a perimeter of five kilometers).

It was a huge victory for Aetius personally but also for the Visigoths, who were now well established in Gaul (not for long, of course, as by 500, the Franks would have expelled them to Spain), as well as for the others (Franks, Burgundians, Alans), who now felt secure in their new homeland. As for Attila, he returned to his base in Pannonia, and the following year, he undertook a tumultuous march and successively occupied Padua, Mantua, Vicentia, Verona, Brescia, and Bergamo, before besieging and capturing Milan. It is a reasonable conclusion that such an undertaking and outcome are not achieved with only a few thousand men, especially when it concerns the siege and capture of large and fortified cities.

As for the battle itself, as a possible estimation for the Huns and their allies’s casulaties is the number of 120,000 men, while the Romans and their allies lost about 60,000, mainly Visigoths but also many Romans and Gauls, while the Alans “not a few,” as well as the Franks, lost 15,000 men.

With hunderends of men involved and many tens of thousands dead, the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains was rightfully named and as the “Battle of Nations”.

Footnotes

[1] Getica, 182, while Attila is characterized as «..the lord of all the Huns, and the sole ruler in the world of almost all the nations of Scythia..», Getica, 178.

[2] Getica, 217, “with the exception of fifteen thousand Gepids and Franks, who met each other at night before the public meeting” (exceptis quindecim milibus Gepidarum et Francorum, qui ante congressionem publicam noctu sibi occurrentes mutuis concidere vulneribus).

[3] Getica, 207 and «..Indeed, in this most famous and strongest war of the nations..», Getica, 217.

[4] PAVLI DIACONI HISTORIA ROMANA, Book 14.6, «..Conueniunt hinc et inde fortissimae nationes, conseruntur acies, fit bellum acre nimis et pertinax, quale uix ulla narratur historia..»

[5] as above, 14.4.

[6] Olymp. CCCVIII.

[7] Ol. 450.

Sources

Jordanes, Getica.

Paul the Deacon, Historia Romana.

Hydatius, Chronicon.

Chronicon Paschale.