Τhe headline of the article originates from Ahmed Moussa-Mi, chief of staff to Chad’s president. New York Times, Aug. 16, 1987, Section 4, Page 24.

Prior to 1978 and Muammar Gaddafi’s ascent to power in Libya in 1969, Libya had already meddled in Chad’s internal affairs. This interference began with the expansion of the Chadian Civil War into northern Chad in 1968. The conflict witnessed four distinct Libyan interventions in Chad, occurring in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981, and 1983–1987. During each of these instances, Gaddafi garnered support from various factions involved in the civil war. Conversely, opponents of Libya found backing from the French government, which militarily intervened to aid the Chadian government in 1978, 1983, and 1986. Libya supported the opposition Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) against the Chadian President Hissène Habré (FANT-Chadian National Armed Forces and the allied FAP (People’s Armed Forces) whose legitimacy refuse to recognise.

In 1985 and 1986, Chad experienced a notable shift in military dynamics, though initially subtle. While political restrictions on the Libyan armed forces played a role, they were secondary. Libyan tactics relied on firepower and frontal assaults, tolerating inefficiency without reducing operational capacity. However, Libyan execution in Chad was poor, making it hard to attribute their decline to political factors. Rather, the key changes were seen in the capabilities of the FANT, Chad’s armed forces. Also the U.S. Reagan administration grew increasingly confrontational, supporting Habré’s FANT as a counterbalance to Libya. In 1985, the U.S. escalated aid to the FANT, including arms, money, intelligence, and diplomatic support.

France also provided advanced weaponry and logistical aid in response to U.S. pressure. Habré and his team wisely chose lighter, more versatile equipment over heavier options like tanks and artillery. They prioritized items such as trucks, automatic weapons, grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, mortars, and antitank and antiaircraft systems. They also requested substantial quantities of advanced weaponry like U.S.-made Redeye SAMs and French Milan ATGMs. Habré improved FANT’s military strength by selecting talented battlefield leaders such as Idris Deby, Ahmed Gorou, Muhammad Nouri, and Hassan Djamous between 1983 and 1986. These commanders displayed aggression, adaptability, and expertise in leading crucial units.

As 1987 dawned, the Libyan expeditionary force still presented a formidable presence, comprising 8-11.000 soldiers, 300 tanks, multiple rocket launchers, standard artillery pieces, Mi-24 helicopters, and approximately sixty combat aircraft having bolstered their presence since September 1985. Notably, these forces operated without unified command, instead being split into two primary operational groups. The Operational Group South, with 2,500 troops, operated in the Tibesti region, while the Operational Group East was stationed in Faya-Largeau.

As Habré had already greatly strengthened his position thanks to staunch US support was ready to go on the counterattack with his 10.000 regulars backed by abouy 20.000 tribal irregulars. One more Libyan attack commenced on February 10, 1986, saw the combined forces of 5,000 Libyan and 5,000 GUNT troops focusing their efforts on the FANT outposts of Kouba Olanga, Kalait, and Oum Chalouba. However, the endeavor ended disastrously for Gaddafi as a FANT counteroffensive on February 13, utilizing recently acquired French equipment, forced the attackers to hastily withdraw and reassess their strategy.

The escalation of additional hostilities between Chad and Libya in August 1987 stemmed from a disagreement regarding the sovereignty of the Aouzou Strip (a strip of land in northern Chad that lies along the border with Libya) in northern Chad. Libyan engagement in Chad was significantly driven by this territorial dispute and the Libyan governor Muammar Gaddafi has reportedly stated that if Chad were to relinquish control of the Aouzou Strip, he would consider the war concluded and would refrain from further involvement in Chad’s internal affairs.

Chad’s first major victory occurred at Fada (in the Northeast), on January 2, 1987 where around 2,000 Libyan soldiers and the main body of Oumar’s forces were stationed around a heavily fortified communications base. Units from the FAP and FANT surrounded the base and engaged in weeks of harassment against the Libyan forces without mounting a direct assault. Capitalizing on their extensive knowledge of the terrain, including alternative routes to the base unknown to the Libyans, the FANT, under the leadership of thirty-year-old Hassan Djamous, launched their attack.

The material losses were enormous, with 156 battle tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or captured, and half of the force was either killed or captured. According to one source, there was ‘discreet but firm support” from the French but this alone couldn’t justify the great disaster for the Libyans. The conflict was heavily lopsided, resulting in the complete decimation of the Libyan forces and the seizure of a substantial amount of equipment. About 784 Libyans and their Chad allies were killed and 81 were captured, while 103 main battle tanks were destroyed or captured as 51 more armoured vehicles.

Chadian forces meticulously planned their assault on Ouadi (Wadi) Doum. Acting primarily as a logistical hub, the base boasted a 3,800-meter runway constructed by the East Germans. Defenses included SAM and Crotale missiles, as well as antiaircraft guns mounted on carriers. The garrison, numbering 5-7.000 soldiers, was supported by approximately 200-300 tanks and armored vehicles. The offensive on Ouadi Doum followed two remarkable ambushes on March 19-20 targeting Libyan convoys in the Bir-Kora Pass, situated 50 kilometers from Ouadi Doum and destroying a Libyan column advancing to reconquer Fada and re-take Zouar, in Tibesti, on March 21, 1987.

These ambushes resulted in the deaths of between 800 and 1,000 Libyan troops, with 120 taken captive. Disregarding the Geneva Conventions, the FANT utilized some of the captured Libyans to navigate through the minefields encircling the camp, ultimately launching their attack. Despite the preceding engagements, the assault caught the Libyans off guard, with no apparent special precautions taken. In the ensuing 18-hour clash, around 1.700 Libyan soldiers perished -1.269 Killed in Action (KIA) and 438 Prisoners of War (POW-, while the remaining 3,000 fled into the cover of night, scattering in all directions. The Chadian forces seized vast quantities of equipment (they captured 31 T-55 tanks and destroyed another 86) during the engagement while Chadians had 29 KIA and 58 Wounded in Action (WIA). Among the Libyan prisoners was their commander, Colonel Khalifa Haftar, the military leader of the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020).

Despite the seemingly strong power it possessed at its bases in Chad, Libya was a giant with clay feet. Stranded across vast expanses of desert and lacking intimate knowledge of the terrain compared to their Chadian adversaries, the Libyans found themselves isolated and vulnerable in the harsh Chadian desert. The Libyan High Command hesitated to risk its expensive aircraft in engagements with small groups of mobile warriors or the cheaper, highly maneuverable Toyotas that served as modern “hit and run” cavalry and despite possessing numerous tanks, the Libyans found them ineffective in the unconventional warfare tactics employed by their opponents. From the other hand, Chadians displayed remarkable agility and unwavering determination in combat with their Toyotas and portable missiles sourced from France and the United States and they pioneered a unique style of desert warfare.

Libya gave the order the Faya-Largeau evacuation, the last remaining Libyan stronghold south of Aouzou. In the euphoria of triumph, Habré envisioned persisting in the battle until he had regained control of the Aouzou Strip, seized by Libya in 1974. Qadhafi ordered the recapture of Aouzou, deploying nearly 15,000 troops against the FANT. Despite preliminary bombardment, Libyan frontal assaults failed on August 14, resulting in over 200 casualties. Libyans regrouped but faced another defeat. Concentrating firepower, Libya succeeded on August 28, benefiting from Chadian withdrawals. This victory, costly for Libya with 1,225 dead and 262 wounded, saw novice Chadian commanders overwhelmed by superior Libyan numbers and firepower.

Following their victory at Aouzou, Libya attempted to expand its gains by attacking Ounianga Kebir, but Chadian forces swiftly repelled them. Simultaneously, Chadian leader Habré ordered Djamous to raid Maatan as-Sarrah in Libya. In a stunning success, on September 5th, simultaneous with the Libyan setback at Ounianga Kebir, Chadian forces launched a surprise assault on Maatan as-Sarrah airbase. Despite its 2,500-strong garrison, including a brigade of tanks and extensive fortifications, the Chadians swiftly overwhelmed the defenders.

They inflicted staggering losses: over 1,700 Libyan soldiers killed, 300 captured, and the destruction of 26 aircraft, 70 tanks, 30 APCs, and various other equipment. The Chadians incurred 65 dead and 112 wounded, marking a resounding victory. However, France, suspicious of Chadian intentions, pressured for a ceasefire, fearing a broader Chadian offensive into Libya. Throughout 1987, Libya suffered at least 7.500 dead and nearly 1,000 captured soldiers in addition to losing nearly $1.5 billion worth of equipment, in- cluding twenty-eight aircraft and over 800 tanks and APCs while Chadians had about 1.000 killed.

Because of opposition within Libya, internal demoralization, and international hostility, Gaddafi shifted to a more conciliatory approach after his defeat. On October 3, diplomatic relations between the two nations were reinstated and a development occurred in September 1990 when both countries agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. On February 3, 1994, the court ruled in favor of Chad, conclusively resolving the Aouzou dispute by awarding the territory to the southern nation. Under the supervision of international observers, the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the Strip commenced on April 15 and was finalized by May 10.

Sources:

P. Kenneth, «Arabs at war : military effectiveness, 1948-1991», publ. University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

S. Nolutshungu, «Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad», publ. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

L. Neveille, «Technicals: Non-Standard Tactical Vehicles from the Great Toyota War to modern Special Forces», publ. Osprey Publishing, 2018

G.Naldi, «The Aouzou Strip Dispute—A Legal Analysis», Journal of African Law, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), pp. 72-77.

M. Azvedo, «The Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad», publ. Routledge, 1998.