Text by Manolis Chatzimanolis

In January 1964, the Arab states, during the first Arab Conference, faced a significant strategic issue. Following the Arab defeat in the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine, large numbers of Palestinian Arabs either became citizens of the new state of Israel or sought refuge in neighboring Arab states, creating an acute refugee crisis. Meanwhile, Israel was continually strengthening. Its population was growing, mainly through immigration (reaching 2.3 million by 1967, with Arabs comprising 13%), and its economic power increased with support from the United States, contributions from Jews abroad, and reparations from West Germany. At the same time, it was constantly reinforcing its armed forces, particularly its air force and armored units.

Agriculture was a key driver of Israel’s economic and demographic growth. Consequently, the effective exploitation of water sources, especially in the Upper Galilee region, was a matter of vital importance. By 1964, Israel had completed an ambitious project to construct a massive pipeline transporting water from the Sea of Galilee to the arid Negev Desert in the south (see image 1).

In this context, the delegates of the Arab Conference in January 1964 decided that a top political priority was to deprive Israel of the vital water artery of the Jordan River. In September of the same year, a concrete plan to divert the Jordan River was outlined: Syria would divert its tributary, the Hasbani River, reducing its water volume by 25%, while Jordan would contribute further by diverting the Yarmouk River. In a second phase, Syria planned to divert the Banias River by constructing a 45-kilometer canal and 3 kilometers of tunnels, cutting the Jordan River’s water volume in half.

Theoretically, Syria held an advantage, as in 1964 it still controlled dominant positions on the Golan Heights, from where Syrian forces harassed Israeli farmers and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrols. A demilitarized zone imposed by the UN lay between the Golan Heights and Israeli positions. When Major General Elazar, the commander of Israel’s Northern Command, detected Syrian activities from Tel Dan, the IDF General Staff authorized, in an initial response, the deployment of a tank squadron with elite crews.

The use of artillery and air support was considered undesirable, as it could lead to uncontrollable escalation, and the first skirmishes between Israeli Centurion tanks and Syrian recoilless rifles and PzKpfw IV tanks had disappointing results due to Israeli gunners’ inexperience in firing beyond 800 meters. However, Israel was fortunate to have Major General Israel Tal as head of the Armored Corps, one of the most skilled and inventive officers in the Israeli military.

Tal proposed a series of measures to enhance the skills of Israeli gunners, and the high command adopted these recommendations. A new firing range was established in the Negev Desert, where tank crews underwent intensive nine-month training. This included theoretical instruction in ballistics and hands-on practice in both precision direct fire at targets up to 1,500 meters away (when typical practice involved 4-meter targets at distances of 800-1,000 meters) and indirect fire with the assistance of observers using binoculars and helicopters—reaching extreme ranges for tank technology at the time, beyond 3 kilometers.

The Israelis took an unprecedentedly meticulous approach, constructing an accurate replica of the Golan region at the Negev firing range. They equipped their Centurion and Sherman tanks with 105mm L7 and 75mm CN 75-50 guns, respectively. The training program included not only conscripts but also reservists, with a focus on personnel specialization. Senior gunners were tasked with calibrating and zeroing the tanks using specialized instruments to achieve a standardized level of accuracy.

The results soon became apparent: in successive skirmishes in mid-November 1964, March 6, May 13, and August 11 of 1965, Israeli tank crews wreaked havoc on Syrian bulldozers, recoilless rifles, mortars, and tanks. In the final confrontation, Israeli forces destroyed a Syrian PzKpfw IV at a range of 1,500 meters, an excavation machine over 7 kilometers away, and a T-34 tank at 3 kilometers, with only one Israeli crew member wounded. The Syrians were forced to relocate their operations to a new position 22 kilometers east of the Sea of Galilee, beyond the reach of Israeli positions. An Israeli air raid subsequently destroyed this new site, halting Syrian efforts.

The capture of the Golan Heights in the Six-Day War of 1967 would ultimately end Arab plans to divert the Jordan River.

Sources:

Panagiotis Nikitopoulos, The Water War in the Middle East (1964-1965), article in Military History, Periskopio Publications.

Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples

War over Water (Jordan River), Wikipedia: War over Water (Jordan River)