Cover photo: Turkish mounted artillery during operations of Franco-Turkish war. The rider on the white horse is Captain Yoruk Selim Bey, the commanding officer.

At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire found itself unable to maintain its statehood. France, one of the Allied powers, eyed, among other territories, the lands of Cilicia. The only focal point of resistance was Mustafa Kemal, who reorganized the remnants of the army and counterattacked on the “southern front” of the Turkish War of Independence. The French Chief of Staff, Ferdinand Foch, took charge of creating the French Army of the East, mainly composed of colonial troops. The force included the 156th Division, manned by Africans under General Julien Dufleix, the 17th Senegalese Infantry Regiment, the 18th Algerian Rifle Regiment, two battalions of the 415th Infantry Regiment, and Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian cavalry troopers. The total strength reached 34 infantry battalions, 5 1/2 engineering battalions, 15 1/2 cavalry regiments, and 13 artillery regiments. General Henri Gouraud was appointed as the Commissioner in Syria and Cilicia.

At the same time, Kemal acted swiftly. He landed in Samsun on June 6, 1919, and in Amasya on June 18, 1919, the first text-proclamation of the Turkish people’s resistance against the Allied decisions, known as the protocol of the military leadership meeting, was issued. Kemal emerged from this meeting with the title of General Commander. Simultaneously, the convening of the National Congress was decided in Erzurum on July 23, 1919, and in Sivas from September 4 to 13, 1919.

Decisions were made regarding the organization and commencement of the resistance struggle, proposed for the time being as a continuous harassment of the Allied Forces. General guidelines for training and equipment, subordination to a unified administration, and the method of dealing with invaders were determined, emphasizing continuous disruption and efforts to disorganize communication and supply lines. The need for forming a government was stressed, and the non-surrender of “a spark of Turkish soil” was emphasized.

On January 21, 1920, French General Kiéret made a gloomy assessment of the situation in the city of Maras, as skirmishes had already ocured from 27th of November 1919. The tragic lack of supplies and the inability to secure reinforcements left him with little room for maneuver, seriously contemplating the idea of abandoning the city. On the same day, gunfire was heard from the direction of the German hospital. The siege of Maraş had begun. The Kemalists initiated armed resistance against the French.

Armed groups, in coordination with Turkish residents of the city, occupied houses at key points, killing several French soldiers and Christian civilians. The French responded with artillery and machine gun fire, leading to a fierce battle. Lieutenant Colonel Timbault was impressed by the fierce and aggressive spirit of the Turks. Every Christian house that fell into their hands was certain not to have any survivors. The next day, many civilians sought refuge in schools and churches, while communications to Adana and Aintab were completely cut off.

Turkish historian Saral describes the harsh battles of the first three days, with French fire destroying many houses, Turks suffering heavy losses in areas defended by Armenians but “the balance steadily tilting towards the Turkish side.” In the church of Saint George, 50 soldiers and thousands of civilians were trapped in a building square and were saved only through the superhuman efforts of a French detachment. None of the women, children, or elderly who stayed behind survived.

The official reports of Turkish military history reveal that the conflict in Maraş was not just a local uprising in the city but represented the beginning of the nationalist movement in Cilicia with the goal of expelling the French and, ostensibly unmentioned, the annihilation of Armenians. The Turks systematically began to dismantle the Armenian quarter, setting fire to every house. Approximately 500 to 600 Armenians who took refuge in the church of Saint Stephen and resisted were burned alive when the Turks managed to surround and set it ablaze with kerosene. In the Koubet neighborhood and the church of Saint Sarkis, the resistance was greater, causing some losses to the Turks, but the defenders, along with 3,000 Armenians, were forced to retreat due to the arrival of unruly Turkish reinforcements.

A testimony from surgeon Dr. Gazarjan at the German hospital in the city reports that a group that slaughtered about 3,000 Armenians consisted of Turks, Kurds, and Circassians led by Vagizet Zante Sukri. In the Asdvadzadzin temple, 50 legionnaires held resistance until the Turks managed to open two holes and pour kerosene inside. Few survived from the 50 armed individuals and 2,000 Christian civilians who attempted to escape.

In the Tas Khan neighborhood, the Turks failed to approach as French resistance was firm, and they even lost an entire group attempting to set fire, including their leader, Evliyé Efendi. On the fifth day of the battle, on January 24, 1920, morale on the French-Armenian side was low. They saw day by day, one neighborhood after another falling into Turkish hands and going up in flames. Many French officers refused to get involved in the rescue of the Christian element of the city. Efforts to contact other garrisons became impossible, and messengers were killed en route by the gangs.

Meanwhile, in Beirut, General Gouraud learned on January 8th about the conflicts between the French and the Turks. He considered it a bluff and believed that a small mission could achieve a friendly agreement. For this mission, he called Lieutenant Colonel Robert Normand of the engineers. He tasked him with going to Diyarbakir, Mardin, and Urfa, carrying messages of goodwill from the French to restore order. Apparently, the French administration had not grasped the situation in Cilicia. Strangely, Normand executed the mission and returned alive. Gouraud learned about the difficult situation in Urfa and gained awareness of Maraş. He then organized an expeditionary force with three battalions of Algerian infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, two mountain artillery batteries, a hospital unit, and a group with wireless telegraphy to restore communication.

There was a significant delay as the force only started on February 2nd. On the way, on February 5th, 135 out of the 250 loaded camels disappeared as the French entrusted their guard to… Turkish guards. A battalion of Normand found some Armenian legionnaires besieged in Bel Pounar, where they guarded a military depot, by 200 Turks. The Turks were easily repelled by the French. The column reached Ak Sou on February 7th, where the vanguard repelled an attack by Turks in Ottoman army uniforms.

In the afternoon of the same day, they arrived in the city of Maraş. The arrival of reinforcements caused great enthusiasm among the exhausted forces of the city’s garrison. Early the next morning, the Algerian infantry, together with the cavalry and every element of the artillery, routed 250 Turks in their trenches and launched a stormy assault. By 09:00, the Turks were repelled, and the rejuvenated garrison attacked and captured the remaining parts of the city.

However, the situation was still critical. Without food and the ability to immediately send a convoy with supplies, there was no choice but to evacuate the city. General Kéret faced a dilemma as the senior officer and commander of the Maraş garrison. Normand, having eliminated Turkish resistance in Maraş, had the right to return to Islahiye and explained the reasons he could not stay. His men were eating half a ration of food and suffering from extremely low temperatures – continuous snowfall and up to minus 18 degrees Celsius – without shelter. Pack animals had no fodder for many days, and he was obligated to reinforce the garrison of Urfa. Supplies were enough for only four days, and every attempt to replenish them from Aïntab or Bel Pounar had failed. The climax was the departure of Colonel Corneloup with 13 companies without even obtaining authorization from his superior.

Undoubtedly, the fate anticipated for the Armenians weighed on the conscience of the French general. Eventually, he decided to secretly withdraw the French force and abandon the refugees, as they would hinder the return. In the early morning hours of February 11th, the French left, but the Armenian legionnaires with them, deeply displeased by the abrupt abandonment of their compatriots, alerted their fellow Armenians. The equipment that could not be transported was destroyed. About 4,000 to 5,000 Armenians followed the French column, and many of them died from exhaustion and frostbite on the way to Islahiye, where they spent the night. Few had shoes for winter travel, and they woke up the next day covered with 20 centimeters of snow. After three days of travel, they reached Islahiye.

The retreat dealt a severe blow to the morale of the French. The losses are estimated at 1,200 men. The distinguished 412th Regiment suffered 223 casualties, including 122 dead. Normand reported only 11 dead and 35 wounded soldiers from his unit, but had 150 frostbite cases. The Senegalese and Algerian units suffered a total of 630 losses. Turkish losses, as presented in the personnel report, were 200 dead and 500 wounded. However, these numbers likely represent the losses suffered only by the regular units of the 3rd Caucasian Division of the 9th Army and two cavalry regiments.

The local sheriff, the governor of the administrative division of a sanjak, reported on February 29, 1920, that he estimated the dead in Marash to be between 6,000 and 8,000, with 4,000 Armenians and the rest irregular Turkish soldiers and civilian. The Armenians, especially the civilian population, paid the highest blood toll. Before the siege, the city of Marash had approximately 24,000 Armenian residents, while after the French withdrawal on February 11, 1920, only about 9,700 remained. If we also consider the 1,000-1,200 who died from the hardships of the transition to Islahiye, we reach a number of 12,700-13,700 survivors from the initial 24,000, which is roughly half of Marash’s original Armenian population.

Bibliography

S.E. Keer, “The lions of Marash, personal experiences with American Near East Relief”, SUNY Press, 1973.

A. Mango, “Ataturk, the biography of the founder of modern Turkey”, Woodstock and New York, 1999.

G. Mourellos, “The French-Turkish approach of 1921: the Franklin-Bouillon agreement and the evacuation of Cilicia”, Bulletin of the Center for Asia Minor Studies, vol. 4, Athens, 1983.

Br. M. Abadie, “Operations in the Levant- the 4 sieges of Aintab (1920-1921)”, Paris, 1922.