Cover photo: France, Champagne Province.- German infantrymen taking action under the protection of smoke grenades. Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R05944.

Reorganization, Retreat, and Elastic Defense.

In the middle of the war, following the deliberations at the Cambrai conference, the transformation of the German army began. This transformation was structured around two main axes: the training of infantry in defensive tactics and the introduction to new offensive methods. The fundamental principles of this offensive doctrine were outlined in the manual “Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg,” or in a free translation, “the attack in trench warfare.” This served as the foundation for the revitalized German army, which achieved relatively significant successes during the spring offensive of 1918.

During this period, Ludendorff and Hindenburg relieved Falkenhayn of his position on the Western Front, visibly dissatisfied with the course of the battle at Verdun. Hindenburg became the new chief of the OHL, while Ludendorff acted more as his subordinate and advisor. However, Ludendorff played a decisive role with the views he expressed at the conference. He strongly advocated for better training in the use of grenades and rifles, adapted to the new circumstances. He also argued that there was a shortage of machine guns, mortars, and other weapons.

In the autumn of 1916, the implementation of the “Hindenburg Program” began, a program with socio-economic extensions aimed at supporting the war effort. It envisioned a tripling of machine gun production, doubling of ammunition production, and a significant increase in rifle, mortar, and aircraft production. Indeed, during 1916, a machine gun platoon initially had six machine guns, which eventually increased to 12 by the end! Firepower increased rapidly without underestimating defensive innovations.

From late 1916, the Germans were forced to plan a strategic withdrawal from the Arras and Soissons regions, codenamed “Alberich.” The British dubbed the new German defensive position as the “Hindenburg Line.” Pressured on many fronts, the Germans, partly due to the success of the Brusilov Offensive, implemented the plan in February 1917, saving 13 divisions. During their retreat, they destroyed anything that could be useful to the Allies while preparing with the new defensive doctrine. The principles of the latter were outlined in the manual “Führung während der Abwehrschlacht.”

Subsequently, Ludendorff considered the German defense inflexible, leading to unnecessary, unsustainable losses. The previous mentality of hard battles for every inch of ground gave way to “elastic defense.” According to the theory of “elastic defense in depth,” defenders were not supposed to concentrate decisively on the front line. On the contrary, there was an advanced zone with machine gun positions. This zone was not the key to German defense, as it was the primary target of enemy artillery but held back Allied patrols. The main line was behind the advanced position, often exploiting the terrain relief. Simultaneously, it was structured into three lines of trenches, out of reach of enemy artillery but within the Allied range. When the enemy created a gap, aggressive groups would launch counterattacks laterally, in a pincer-like style.

In the Battle of Cambrai, where tanks were used en masse for the first time, the shock was significant for the defenders. However, under the guidance of Marwitz, the Germans managed to launch a counterattack ten days later, regaining significant ground. In the contested location of Gonnelieu, a group under Gersbach/110 SP successfully neutralized enemy resistance, with crucial fire support. This paved the way for the 109th Regiment. In conclusion, the repulsion of the opponent did not occur in the advanced trenches, which they could shell with their artillery, but in carefully selected positions.

During the German offensive of 1918, the British deployed a similar system called the “defense in depth,” extending 12 miles. Initially, there was a forward zone with machine guns, outposts, anti-tank guns, and wire entanglements. Two miles behind was the main defensive location (Battle zone) with artillery of the engaged divisions, machine guns, and more obstacles. At a close distance behind the main line were reserve heavy artillery units for supporting potential counterattacks. At a distance of 4 to 8 miles was the last defensive position (Read zone), and further back were the headquarters, etc. However, due to personnel shortages, the defensive positions of Generals Byng and Gough were inadequate.

New tactics and preparation for the final assault.

The infiltration tactics, as known to the Allies, were based on surprise and effective cooperation between artillery, assaulting infantry, and assault groups. Two individuals were particularly associated with these tactics, Oskar von Hutier and Georg Bruchmüller. (5) The former for infantry infiltrations and the latter for the more effective use of artillery to suppress enemy defense. In September 1917, Hutier’s 8th Army launched an attack against the 12th Russian Army in Riga, a strategic city south of St. Petersburg.

After a five-hour bombardment by Bruchmüller, infantry assault teams appeared. Three days later, they entered Riga, but the capital’s objective was abandoned as Kerensky’s provisional government fell. This resounding victory was one of the decisive ones in the war and mobilized the German leadership, who sent the two officers to the Western Front to share their knowledge. Shortly thereafter, at Caporetto, using these tactics, Otto von Bellow’s forces delivered a harsh lesson to the Italians.

Although Hutier gained great fame, he is not the one who developed all these methods; rather, he solidified and improved them. (6) After bombarding enemy positions, protected by artillery, aggressive units called “Sturmtruppen” would reach enemy trenches and exploit the weak points they had already identified. Their aim was to reach administrative positions, artillery positions, etc., avoiding strong defensive positions. Then, “Stosstruppen” units, armed with machine guns and grenades, would take over. Behind the Sturmtruppen, the Stosstruppen aimed to weaken and neutralize the strong defensive positions that the former avoided. In contrast to Cardona, there is also the version where the assault detachments precede. Subsequently, they are followed by aggressive units that exploit the gaps left by the first ones. Regarding the terminology, there is some confusion; however, they were units of similar combat value receiving the same training.

In early 1918, with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Germans managed to transfer 41 divisions from the Eastern Front and another 9 from the Italian and Serbian fronts, bringing them to 197 divisions on the front facing the French! Before the spring offensive, several divisions withdrew behind the lines to be trained in the new offensive doctrine. These offensive divisions, known as “Angriffdivisionen” – roughly estimated at 56 – were to lead the impending attack.

Most of these formations had participated in offensive operations during 1916-17. Having relative experience, they received reinforcements in terms of men, horses, new weapons, to be fully equipped. At the same time, these divisions were supplemented by a second regiment of field artillery, a regiment of heavy artillery, and a third engineer company. The remaining divisions on the western front were known as “Stellungsdivisionen” and did not meet the requirements for retraining. As it becomes clear, the tactics that were initially known only to elite soldiers spread to entire divisions.

What largely determined the course of the Great War was the artillery. With multi-day barrages, it attempted to disrupt the defense so that the infantry could easily occupy enemy positions. For example, in the Campania region in 1915, more than 1000 artillery pieces pounded for three days. The barrage preceding the Third Battle of Ypres in Flanders is characteristic, lasting two weeks! Thus, the position and time of the main attack were perceived, allowing the defenders to gather reserve forces for a possible counterattack. Since it was not such a successful tactic, the artillery was to be retrained and harmonized with the new doctrine.

In early 1918, many regiments were transferred to the rear to be trained in the new methods developed by Bruchmüller on the Eastern Front. Given the importance of surprise, it was concluded that the artillery barrage must be very intense but brief, aiming to neutralize enemy infantry rather than destroy their positions. During the capture of Riga by Hutier’s 8th Army, Bruchmüller’s artillery bombarded enemy positions for just 5 hours. (7)

Based on this thinking, the combined use of tear gas and chemical gases to disorganize the defenders was perfected. When tear gas shells were fired simultaneously with phosphorus, enemy gunners were forced to remove their masks to relieve irritation in their eyes, leaving them exposed to lethal gases. The most significant aspect of the ideas entrenched in the German battle doctrine was the creeping barrage, known as “Feuerwalze” by the Germans. The line of artillery shell impacts moved 100 meters every two minutes, roughly 50 meters ahead of the advancing infantry, covering the no man’s land area. However, it required exemplary synchronization of infantry and artillery because if the shells preceded too much, the element of surprise would be lost, and conversely, there was a risk of friendly fire. It was first used in the summer of 1916 on the River Somme but was perfected after mid-1917 by Bruchmüller.

The brief bombardment of enemy positions required high precision and centralized command to achieve surprise in areas of the main effort. (8) The desired ratio of artillery was calculated to be at least three artillery battalions against one enemy battalion. To achieve surprise, the artillery had to unleash a brief fire without preceding “registration fire,” as was customary. This could render artillery support ineffective and expose it to enemy fire. Officer Erich Pulkowski provided the solution with a more mathematical method (the Pulkowski Verfahren), relying on two axes. Initially, he took into account the weather conditions prevailing, such as wind direction and speed, which could affect the trajectory of shells. Depending on the weather conditions, special considerations were taken into account.

It involved the “customization” of each artillery battalion based on the characteristics of its guns, the speed at which the projectile leaves the barrel, the physical wear from years of use, etc. To determine the ballistic characteristics of the guns, they underwent testing in the rear, a process called calibration. Initially, Pulkowski did not receive the acceptance he expected, so together with Bruchmüller, they approached senior officers. A fervent supporter was Von Kuhl, chief of staff of Prince Rupprecht’s army group. In fact, in early 1918, he requested that this method be accepted, but the highest German command refused! Since Bruchmüller had jurisdiction only over the 18th Army, Pulkowski trained 6,000 officers. During Operation “Michael,” part of the spring offensive, it was the only army that used these techniques.

The German artillery was structured into the following four main categories:

Infantriebekampfungsartillerie (IKA): These units constituted the vast majority of the artillery and were used for supporting fire for infantry or for fire against enemy forward positions.

Artilleriebekampfungsartillerie (AKA): This comprised around 20% of the artillery (mostly Feldartillerie – Light Field artillery) and was tasked with anti-artillery fire.

Fernkampfartillerie (FEKA): This consisted of long-range artillery pieces that targeted key areas deep within enemy defenses, reserves, etc.

Schwerste Flachfeuerartillerie (SCHWEFLA): These units were responsible for heavy artillery, railway guns, and howitzers like the 42cm M-Gerat. Their purpose was to target strategic objectives such as headquarters, communication hubs, and fortifications.

During preparatory fires, the artillery was under the command of the IKA category. As the infantry advanced, their command was taken over by the respective formations.

The Role of Tanks and Aircraft:

Although the Great War was decisively influenced by infantry, the effective combination of infantry with tanks and aircraft was very promising. Aircraft made their appearance in the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, and in 1915, the Germans were the first to adopt a synchronization system. This regulated the forward machine gun so that it did not fire when the propeller was in front of it. Regarding the new tactics of the German army, aircraft held a key position. Support units (Schlachtstaffeln) were created with aircraft like the Junkers CL-1 or other models. Deployed from positions behind attacking divisions, their purpose was to engage ground targets of strategic importance such as communications, depots, hubs, and supply lines.

Tanks made their appearance in 1916 at the Flers-Courcelette sector, on the wide front of the River Somme. The Germans managed to create only 17 tanks, few compared to the British, and were at least a year late. They initially used their own A7V tanks as well as many British Mark tanks, most of which were captured during the Cambrai counterattack. The A7V tanks were bulky with heavy armor but provided a barely tolerable environment for its 21 crew members. They carried a 5.7 cm Maxim-Nordenfelt gun manufactured in Belgium, spoils of war taken by the Germans from Belgian and Russian fortifications.

Three offensive armored detachments were created around the Panzers, known as “Stuka,” an abbreviation of Sturm-Panzerkraftwagen-Abteilungen. The first two Stukas were created in late September 1917, while the third was formed on November 9. Captured tanks created a total of 6 detachments called Beutekampfwagen-Abteilungen, two of which were formed in March 1918 and the rest in the spring. Tank crews were trained alongside infantry since their interaction was a given. In the case of Stuka 1 crew, before its first engagement, it was sent to Beuveille to train with a section of Sturmbataillon Nr.5 Rohr. When assault units failed to breach the defense, tanks would neutralize or weaken obstacles. In the event of damage that couldn’t be repaired, the crew would abandon it with the intention to attack as an assault unit, provided they had received relevant training.

Footnotes

(5) Hutier, Ludendorff’s cousin and an officer in the 21st Division on the Eastern Front in 1915. Two years later, as commander of the 8th Army, he captured Riga using infiltration tactics. He was then transferred to the Western Front and took command of the newly formed 18th Army during the major spring offensive of 1918.

(6) Regarding tactics, it is worth noting that the Frenchman Laffargue held similar views. His work titled “Étude sur l’attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre” was published in 1916 and fell into the hands of German agents, potentially influencing the German side. In 1917, various assault units were formed in other armies such as the French or the Italian (see Arditi).

(7) Something similar was applied by the Russians in the highly successful Brusilov Offensive.

(8) According to David T. Zabecki, in the early stages of the war, the artillery did not have centralized control but was under the control of each division. Bruchmüller was among the first proponents of centralized fire control.

Bibliography

Ian Drury, “German Stormtrooper 1914-1918“, Osprey Publishing, 1995.
R.R Cardona, “Sturmtruppen: WWI German stormtroopers 1914-1918“, Andrea Press, 2014.
D.T. Zabecki, “Operational art and the German 1918 Offensives”, Routledge, 2006.
Ian Passingham , “All the Kaiser’s men: The life and death of the German Army on the Western front 1914-1918”, The History Press, 2005.
Hew Strachan, “The First World War: A New History”, Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2014.