Cover photo: German stormtroopers training in Sedan, France (1917).

Text by Konstantinos Bagiotas.

The situation in 1914.

During the Great War, new weapons were used for the first time or on a large scale. However, military tactics initially remained faithful to outdated ideas, with dense formations attacking exposed to artillery fire. At a tactical level, squads attacked in linear formation. Usually, an advanced position was held by a platoon, while the rest were positioned on the flanks or behind the vanguard. If the vanguard failed to prevail with its fire, the reserves, often fluctuating, were involved. When the defense showed signs of yielding, cavalry units intervened, along with men armed with lances. The predominant use of machine guns and repeating rifles led to a revision of such battle formations because the larger the main combat units, the more vulnerable the men were. At the same time, the distance between men in early 1914 ranged from 1-3 meters, gradually widening to reduce losses.

The French seem to have maintained distances while having a different view on the use of artillery compared to the Germans. The latter perceived it more as a dominant weapon, unlike the French who considered it supplementary. In any case, despite the importance of firepower, there were strong defensive positions that were not easily neutralized. At a strategic level, the German “Schlieffen Plan”, with whatever modifications it underwent, was not successfully implemented. Consequently, the armies were immobilized on vast lines that undermined their efforts. The dominance of static defensive lines by the end of 1914, such as trenches, intensified the problems of major losses compared to minimal territorial gains.

Within the absurdity of outdated tactics, conclusions were drawn that led to the solidification of the struggle. The idea of ​​creating small, flexible, and specially trained units came to the forefront. Their purpose was to neutralize strong defensive obstacles and disrupt communications using the element of surprise. Thus, the assault team was destined to become the core of the German army with decisive consequences for the future of warfare, as well as the value of the individual soldier. It is worth mentioning that the French and the British had drawn similar conclusions, but they failed to translate the theory into practice. Ian Drury argues that the allies also developed similar ideas and units, but they never reached the level of the Germans. The sum of the tactics successfully implemented by the German army was called “Stosstrupptaktik” (1). The basis of all was determination and the element of surprise with which small units struck selected points. It has been argued that the Boers used tactics similar to these.

Establishment of the first units.

Before the outbreak of the war, the Germans had formed special engineer units (2) for manning or occupying fortified positions. The Festungs Pionier Bataillon units were the first to be equipped with hand grenades, wire cutters, flamethrowers, and protective shields because they were the only ones with experience in using such weapons, as well as in siege warfare. Subsequently, units with names according to their activity were developed, such as the Handgranatentrupp units, specializing in grenade use. The German High Command (OHL), determined to regain the initiative in maneuvers, which the Allies held, created the first experimental assault unit, as the spearhead. The commander of the assault detachment – Sturmabteilung, later sturmbataillonen – was Caslow.

These units were permanent, as noted below, but there were also small unofficial units. Several of these consisted of 8 men and a corporal, formed as assault groups (stossgruppen). Such groups existed in many platoons, acted autonomously, and occasionally formed temporary detachments at the platoon or squad level, stosszüge and Stosstrupp respectively. The most select were unmarried, under 25 years old, and Iron Cross holders. (3) Crucial to such units was the commander, as central leadership provided flexibility and initiative in maneuvers.

Regarding the detachment and later Caslow battalion, this was created experimentally by order of the German high command to the VIII army corps. (4) Major Caslow was an officer of the Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 18 engineering unit. The detachment consisted of two engineering platoons supported by a 20-gun unit, consisting of 21 officers and 628 men. These were the sturmkanone 3.7 cm, short-range guns specially designed for use by assault units, as their name suggests. Their main purpose was to neutralize the defenders’ machine guns that were decimating the Germans. Shields of steel armor were also tested at this early stage. In any case, such a proposal was contrary to the agility characteristic of such specialized units, so it was rejected.

The unit’s activity is structured simply into four phases. Infantry leaves the initial positions and, after crossing the dead zone, attacks the first enemy line while simultaneously advancing to the next line, disorganizing the defenders. The guns play a crucial role, neutralizing any obstacles. They then advance to a distance of 50-70 meters from the enemy, fire anti-artillery shots, and finally provide support fire to the attacking assault units. When the defense shows signs of yielding, the assault group men primarily use their grenades to clear the trenches. After three months of training, the detachment was sent to the Loretto front where it was defensively engaged in the major French offensive in the Artois region. It was decimated, losing 10 guns and about half of its men. In a report on June 14, 1915, Caslow himself attributed the poor performance to the fact that the guns were stationed far from the enemy, essentially providing no assistance.

Willy Martin Rohr replaced Caslow in the autumn. During the outbreak of the war, he commanded a platoon of the elite Garde Schutzen Battalion in Campania and later was transferred to Alsace. Rohr emphasized flank attacks by small, flexible units and reinforced the detachment with three platoons equipped with flamethrowers, machine guns, and mortars. These units had 6 flamethrowers, 4 mortars initially, and later 2, then 6 machine guns. It’s worth noting that these units were not organically added to the detachment but served as the basis for creating battalions following assault unit standards. In October, parts of the detachment were engaged in battles in the Vosges Mountains separately.

On October 12, the second platoon was engaged, followed by the first a few days later. In the first case, the platoon acted in 6 assault teams, using flamethrowers and, in combination, machine guns, mortars, and rifles. These units collaborated with Landwehr units and hunters from Jager Nr. 8 battalion. In November, the Sturmkanone was replaced by Russian Putilov 7.62 cm guns. During the battles in the Harmannsweillerkopf area on December 22, the detachment participated fully and tested a helmet shield, trench knives, wire cutters, and the more user-friendly rifle kar.98, particularly known in World War II.

The fundamental principles followed by Rohr’s St.Btl.5 battalion are found in the manual “Anweisung für die Verwendung eines Stürmbatallions”. According to this, the assault battalion moves for days to the location of the impending attack to familiarize itself well. At the same time, it selects suitable points in the enemy’s alignment. With the start of the operation, the detachment is divided into three smaller ones, which will move in separate assault teams. The first storms with flamethrowers, machine guns, etc., to surprise and open passages. A few minutes later, the second and third follow. Their goal is to consolidate the gains with their heavy equipment. The rifles and machine guns support the above effort.

Rohr’s pioneering battalion consisted of:

5 assault platoons with a strength of about 210 men each: 1 machine gun platoon of 6 machine guns, 1 flamethrower platoon, 1 mortar detachment, 1 howitzer platoon.

In any case, the formations created did not have a standardized structure. Their organization was more standardized after the establishment of assault battalions per army. In December 1916, a typical assault battalion consisted of:

-Command detachment with 10 officers and 32 soldiers
-Four assault platoons, each with 4 officers and 120 soldiers
-One or two Machine Gun Companies. Each machine gun company, besides the 6 machine guns, initially had 4 officers and 85 soldiers. Gradually expanded in 1917, with up to 12 machine guns manned by 135 men.
-One flamethrower detachment (4-8 portable weapons)
-One artillery company with 4-6 76.2 mm guns manned by 80 men.
-An engineer platoon with 2 officers and 100 other men, as well as 8 engineers.

The total number of men in a typical assault battalion reached up to 1,400, a number that varied depending on the number of assault platoons. Additionally, even the number of men in a platoon usually ranged from 120 to 200, as in the case of St.Btl.5. The heaviest form of platoon belonged to the 3rd Assault Hunter Battalion, with 263 men. A typical line battalion had about 800 men because they did not have as many heavy weapons, unlike assault battalions that needed relative self-sufficiency.

Unofficial units and first permanent battalions:

On May 15, 1916, Falkenhayn ordered the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and Stranz Armies to select two experienced officers and four non-commissioned officers to be sent to Beuveille. There they would be trained for two weeks to create assault detachments in their divisions. Since then, many units have been formed mainly based on existing Stosstruppen formations. Initially, they were not formations organically integrated into large units but ad hoc units used in specific conditions or training other units later on. The above information demonstrates the higher command’s cautious approach towards them, considering them as training grounds and not elite units.

In June 1916, the high command decided to form new permanent battalions based on the models of assault units. The Jäger-Battalions Nr. 3 and Nr. 5, as well as the reserve units Nr. 5 and 6, were intended to be incorporated into this program. Three officers and twelve non-commissioned officers from each unit were sent to Beuveille to be trained by men from Rohr’s battalion. However, due to the Brusilov Offensive, only the 3rd Jäger Battalion could feasibly be transformed into the Jäger-(Sturm) Battalion Nr. 3 and was subordinated to the 2nd Army. The remaining battalions were subordinated to the Karpathenkorps unit fighting on the Eastern Front, ultimately without receiving training. The assault battalion would consist of 4 Jäger platoons, one machine gun platoon, one engineer platoon, one artillery platoon, and one flamethrower section.

During the spring offensive of 1918, the assault battalion would take on a much heavier form, increasing the number of machine gun and artillery platoons. A similar unit (Marine-Sturmabteilung) was also created in the navy with around 300 men in July. In the autumn, Ludendorff supported at Cambrai the introduction of new battle tactics, for which equipment alone was insufficient. The entire German army, except for the permanent battalions and scattered detachments created in the spring, needed to be initiated into these tactics. Given the above decision, each army had to organize its own permanent assault battalion or at least two detachments each consisting of 2 assault platoons. During the winter of 1916-17, 14 assault battalions were formed, the first of which was Sturmbataillon Nr. 2. In contrast to typical units, assault battalions did not remain on the front lines for long periods. After completing an operation, they returned to the rear for training while receiving double rations, without performing duties.

Equipment:

The German army entered the First World War with the characteristic pickelhaube helmet, which had a spike on top. This served as a propaganda element for the Entente forces but, besides that, it was not practical. Rohr preferred a new type of helmet that provided greater protection to the neck and head, the Stahlhelm. This was established in 1916, and subsequently, new versions were introduced, such as the camouflage version (Mimikry Stahlhelm) or the simple one with extra steel chest protection, the Stirnschild. Various types of shields (see Sturmschild) and personal armor (Sappenpanzer and Grabenpanzer) were tested but rejected because the additional weight reduced the soldier’s mobility.

For assault troops, the equipment they carried was crucial for accomplishing their mission. Perhaps the safest weapon for clearing enemy trenches was the hand grenade, as the soldier’s arm would be exposed for just fractions of a second. A member of assault units typically carried up to 12 hand grenades in their backpack. At the beginning of the war, the individual armament of a German soldier included the Gewehr 1898 rifle, weighing 4.5 kilograms and measuring 1250 millimeters in length, quite large. Therefore, assault units were equipped with the M1898AZ or Karabiner 98, measuring 1090 millimeters in length and weighing 3.5 kilograms. In 1918, they also received the pioneering submachine gun MP-18, quite reliable but effective only up to 200-300 meters, ideal for close combat. The German army received more than 30,000 of these.

Regarding machine guns, the German army had the heavy and cumbersome MG ’08. These were gradually replaced by the lighter MG ’08/15 weighing 19.5 kilograms, while units often equipped themselves with Danish air-cooled Madsen guns, spoils from the Eastern Front. Other machine guns included the very user-friendly Lewis and the Saint Etienne. A characteristic weapon of assault units was the flamethrower, a weapon initially exclusively used by engineer troops. Already in January 1915, the first voluntary flamethrower unit, Flammenwerfer Abteilung, was formed under Reddeman, a former Leipzig firefighter chief. The unit had 12 large flamethrowers and a total of 48 men. A flamethrower, depending on its type, could unleash flames for 20 to 39 meters with a duration of up to 20-45 seconds.

Concerning the provision of fire support, as mentioned, the Sturmkannone left the German leadership disappointed. Therefore, they turned to the Russian 76.2mm gun. The Germans reduced the length of the barrel from 2.28 meters to 1.25 for easier handling, while also removing sights of long range or anything else not useful for shots up to 1,000 meters. Assault units also used mortars (Minenwerfer) and grenade launchers (Granatenwerfer).

Finally, assault units also had close combat weapons (Nahkampf), reminiscent of the Middle Ages. Their favorites were the trench knife Grabendolch and the Grabenkeule, a club with spikes.

Footnotes

(1) The term Stosstrupp is claimed to have been first used in the autumn of 1914. In the Argonne region, units of flamethrowers/engineers, experienced in siege warfare and the use of new weapons, took the lead. Ricardo Recio Cardona distinguishes between the terms “Stosstruppen” and “Sturmtruppen”. The former (shock troops) describe temporary assault units – varying in number – with the aim of carrying out a specific mission (attack, reconnaissance, patrol). The latter (assault troops) were permanent units whose main mission was to disseminate aggressive methods to the rest of the army.

(2) Before the war, there were approximately 30-35 such battalions.

(3) Training was theoretical, practical, and lasted at least 3 weeks. This package taught novices how to recognize, counterattack, launch sudden and brief attacks (coup de mains).

(4) Under the guidance of Colonel Max Bauer, two other experimental detachments were created from engineer troops to develop new trench warfare tactics. The first detachment was designed in January 1915, equipped with 12 flamethrowers, and sent to the front, as was the second, which had mortars. The first was led by Reddemman.

Bibliography

Ian Drury, “German Stormtrooper 1914-1918“, Osprey Publishing, 1995.
R.R Cardona, “Sturmtruppen: WWI German stormtroopers 1914-1918“, Andrea Press, 2014.
D.T. Zabecki, “Operational art and the German 1918 Offensives”, Routledge, 2006.
Ian Passingham , “All the Kaiser’s men: The life and death of the German Army on the Western front 1914-1918”, The History Press, 2005.
Hew Strachan, “The First World War: A New History”, Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2014.