In the field of battle, at times, decisive orders or commanders aiming to risk beyond any logical reasoning shape the outcomes of a clash, surpassing all executive thinking and tactical considerations.

Text by Tasos Malesiadas

August 1870. Almost half a month since the Franco-Prussian War has been declared, and the French have formed the “Army of the Rhine,” numbering around 205,000 men, with plans to increase as reserves are mobilized. In the month that passed from the declaration of war until the 16th of August when the discussed battle took place, the French leadership and its plans regarding movements in a potential war with Prussia (now a reality) had immersed themselves in military and diplomatic spheres.

The “Army of the Rhine,” initially adopting an aggressive formation according to plans, had taken defensive positions. Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Austria not only refrained from waging war against “Prussian slavery” but, except for Austria, also participated pan-Germanically in the war against the French. Additionally, the rapid mobilization of Prussian forces due to railways and administrative care brought the French against troop concentrations they did not expect, depriving them of any aggressive initiative. Defense was their only option.

After three decisive defeats (Wissembourg, Spicheren, Wörth) in the battles on the Franco-Prussian borders, the French “Army of the Rhine” was ordered to withdraw to the fortress of Metz and await reinforcements, which it did. However, the advance of Prussian/German forces forced the French command to further contract towards the Châlons region, where they would unite with new forces. On August 13, the issued order for withdrawal encountered its first difficulties, as the army was in constant contact with Prussian/German forces. With many skirmishes, such as the Battle of Colombey-Nouilly, where von Steinmetz’s reckless aggression almost disorganized all axes of the attack and ultimately did not interrupt the French withdrawal but halted it for twelve hours.

The Prussian command immediately sent a telegraph to Prince Friedrich Karl, commander of the 2nd Army, informing him that the French were withdrawing towards the Verdun region without hindrance. The prince immediately ordered the III Army Corps and later the XII Corps to cross the Moselle and attempt to interrupt the contraction of the forces of the “Army of the Rhine.” Behind them, four more Army Corps followed.
Horses and men were exhausted. The continuous pursuit and only 3 hours of rest the previous day, along with constant contact and skirmishes with the French cavalry and infantry, had depleted the vanguards of the Prussian/German troops. The new order was met with a kind of satire from the common soldiers. The officers were disciplined, and this permeated the entire army.

The French staff were more concerned with planning train routes and maintaining open roads for the contraction and evacuation of the forces of the “Army of the Rhine.” The French soldiers fought as best they could, but their aggressive spirit collided with the hesitancy of the command.
August 15. A patrol of the 9th Hanoverian Dragoon Regiment, specifically the Ille-Ille, whose commander was Major General (Lieutenant General) Oskar von Blumenthal, has exceeded its endurance. However, executing the command’s orders, it advances seeking contact with the French troops to report.
As Ille scatteredly searches for the adversary, her men watch from a distance as the dust rises into the sky, hearing the sound of thousands of French soldiers marching. Moments later, they realize that the French units are converging. A messenger immediately departs for the headquarters of the Saxon general Reimar Constantin von Alvensleben, commander of the III Army Corps, reporting everything witnessed by Ille’s Dragons. The general opens the maps and discovers that the converging section will pass through Vionville, near Mars-la-Tour. There, he plans to confront it to disrupt its progress westward.

However, what the general is unaware of is that he is not facing the contraction of the French rearguard, as he assumed and as von Moltke informed him, but the entirety of the French army, 160,000 fully equipped men ready for battle. Surely, if he knew this, he would have been more cautious in leading his 30,000 men into the upcoming battle. When the battle broke out the next morning on August 16th, the Prussians/Germans conducted aggressive reconnaissance with their cavalry in depth. There, they managed to surprise the French cavalry protecting the flanks of the formation and the heights dominating the field at Rezonville. The French Dragoons, in fact, were cooking when they were called to face the relentless onslaught of their Prussian/German counterparts. With the heights taken by the Prussian/German cavalry, the artillery managed to position itself in very advantageous positions. However, this alone could not judge the outcome of the impending clash.

Despite the German artillery’s overall dominance throughout the war, the French infantry weapons were superior and caused huge losses and fear in the Prussian/German infantry. The French Chassepot rifle was superior to the German Dreyse, “bleeding” the Prussians/Germans in every battle of the war. So, the occupation of the heights was an advantage, but on the other hand, the overwhelming numerical superiority of the French and their well-equipped and battle-ready army did not create winning conditions for the Prussians/Germans. This became evident almost immediately with the generalization of the battle. The German artillery, initially triumphant, asserting its dominance and spreading death in the French lines, soon became the target of the French artillery and continuous attacks by the numerous infantry, forcing it to fall silent and withdraw to avoid destruction.

The situation for the III Corps became unbearable. The relentless pressure and the French assault, supported by overwhelming numbers and fueled by their suppressed aggressiveness, decimated the Prussians/Germans.

By noon, the battle had evolved into an artillery duel, with the French artillery now having the advantage of firing positions. The German artillery, of course, maintained the qualitative advantage of greater range and higher rate of fire, mitigating Alvensleben’s losses. However, the ammunition was gradually depleting, the reserves had mostly already been engaged, and the general’s thoughts were consumed by how to escape the impending disaster. He had already telegraphed the events, waiting for the other army corps to engage, but they were nowhere to be found. French indecision and hesitation once again gave the Prussians/Germans a breath, but the French units were gathering again in an offensive formation.

Four Army Corps against the decimated III Corps entrenched. The last reserve of the Corps was the 12th Cavalry Brigade, numbering 600-800 men, who had remained inactive all day, with Friedrich Wilhelm Adalbert von Bredow as their commander. Von Bredow was a highly experienced cavalry officer. And he was Prussian. Every order for him was sacred, a command from God. And now, his general summoned him. He stood at attention and listened to the reading of the order by the general’s adjutant. Tapping his spurs, in the Prussian manner of attention, he followed with the following exchange:

-The infantry there?
-The fate and outcome of the day depend on it.
-It will cost whatever it needs to.

The order was suicidal. His brigade had to strike the concentrated French infantry behind the artillery positions. The goal of this assault was to hinder the imminent French attack that would lead to the elimination of the III Corps. To buy time for the other Corps to arrive and strike the French army from all sides. The Brigade began its movement. Charging straight ahead into the barrels of the French cannons would be a repetition of the Light Brigade’s massacre in the Crimean War and would bring no result other than the death of his men. Von Bredow organized his men by Regiments. The 7th Regiment of Cuirassiers, the 13th Dragoons, and the 16th Uhlans took their positions. All of them were Prussians.

Von Bredow used the terrain wisely, leading his Brigade covered by folds and exploiting the battle smoke from the continuous artillery fire. In fact, he advanced so far beyond the Prussian/German lines that a comrade from the infantry sent a rider to warn him that this maneuver was dangerous. No one knew his mission, no one knew how he would execute it. The essence of Auftragstaktik was precisely this.
The assault began, and the Cavalry charged with a formidable force against the positions of the French infantry. Simultaneously, as soon as the cavalry passed the artillery positions, where the French infantry had positioned itself, they also attacked the artillery units.

The cavalry’s charge and their sudden presence so deep and abruptly within the French lines created chaos. The first two lines of riflemen were swept away in a pandemonium of weapons, swords, lances, cries, and bugle calls. The panicked French infantry started breaking their formations. The French cavalry, almost 3,500 men strong, reorganized and attempted to counterattack, but their momentum was halted by the continuous waves of infantry, which, though disorganized, had flooded the field. This was compounded by the more disciplined units of the French infantry that, while not abandoning their positions, struck indiscriminately at any horseman they encountered in the heat of battle.

Von Brendow ordered the withdrawal of his forces when he realized that the French infantry was arriving to reinforce their coordinated positions, supported by additional artillery. Every moment the Prussians remained there, they were losing more and more men. The cavalry stayed, sacrificing themselves for their mission, their comrades, and their commander. Only when the withdrawal signal was sounded did they manage to retreat. The assault lasted half an hour, just 30 minutes. Their losses were staggering, losing 50% of their initial strength. However, their mission was accomplished, as the French Army Corps, set to launch the final attack against the beleaguered III Corps, had lost almost all of its artillery and a significant portion of its infantry.

The morale of the French crumbled, and for the next hour, only artillery exchanges continued the battle. This ensured time for the Prussians/Germans, and it proved redemptive because the other Army Corps arrived on the battlefield and gradually joined the fight, attacking the French Army from all directions. At 9 p.m., after 12 hours of battle, the last French troops had withdrawn to nearby heights. Prince Friedrich Karl, who had taken command of the sections, ordered his troops to rest. The French did the same. However, during the night, they managed to disentangle and consolidate, not retreating towards Metz but deeper and directly facing the main bulk of the Prussian/German forces.

The losses of the two forces were seemingly equal – 15,799 Prussians/Germans, 44% of the III Army Corps, and 17,007 French. However, by the end of the day, the salvation of the Prussian/German forces, preventing the French from consolidating in the predetermined path, along with the tremendous moral and emotional breakdown of the French, were the medium and long-term results of this conflict won by the gallantry of a Cavalry Brigade and the military training of its commander.